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Abstract 
The international development community has long been pre-occupied with the reduction of 
absolute income poverty, relegating concerns with inequality to the margins of its policy 
agenda. The Millennium Development Goals, for instance, which were adopted by 189 world 
leaders at the 2000 Millennium Summit, defined the reduction of absolute poverty by 2015 
as its overarching goal. However, concerns about the dramatic rise in income inequality 
across the world have been growing over the last few decades and came to the forefront of 
public consciousness in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008. At the same time, 
assessments of national progress on the Millennium Development Goals made it clear that 
income inequality alone did not explain the distribution of gains and losses across countries. 
Rather it was the intersection of income inequality, marginalized social identities and, very 
often, locational disadvantage which led to the systematic exclusion of certain groups. In 
recognition of this, the Sustainable Development Goals which became the basis of the new 
post-2015 international development agenda now includes a commitment to the reduction of 
income and other inequalities, summarized as the principle of ‘leave no one behind’. Our 
paper uses national data from Brazil between 2002 and 2013 to examine retrospectively how 
it has performed on some of the indicators relating to the inclusive principles articulated by 
the SDGs. We have selected this period in Brazil because at a time when income inequalities 
were rising in most countries of the world, they were declining in Brazil. Our paper examines 
the extent to which this decline in income inequality was accompanied by a decline in 
intersecting inequalities and explores some of the economic, political and social explanations 
given for the country’s performance.  
 
Editorial note and acknowledgements 
We would like to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Amanda Shaw for this 
paper. 
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Section 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Objectives of the study 
 
A concern with absolute poverty, defined as a money-metric measure of basic subsistence 
needs, has occupied a central place within the international development agenda for much 
of its existence. Efforts in recent years to promote a more multidimensional understanding of 
poverty, with a particular focus on human capabilities, have met with some success and there 
has also been a growing literature on discrimination based on social identities such as race, 
gender and ethnicity. Attention to income inequalities waxed and waned in the earlier 
decades of development planning, but has come on to the agenda in a more sustained way 
in recent years.  
 
That these trends have existed largely in parallel to each other within the official development 
discourse was evident in the failure to integrate them within the Millennium Development 
Goals. The MDG agenda declared its overarching goal to be the halving of extreme poverty 
(MDG 1) but was largely silent on the underlying inequalities that generated extreme poverty 
as one of its symptoms.  
 
It has been harder to ignore inequality in the intervening years. The global financial crisis of 
2008 underscored the steady growth in income inequalities since the 1980s. It finally led the 
international financial institutions to acknowledge that income inequality not only slowed 
down the translation of growth into poverty reduction but compromised the sustainability of 
growth itself.  At the same time, as the 2015 deadline for the MDGs approached and various 
assessments of its successes and limitations took place, one clear thread of criticism running 
through these assessments was their failure to acknowledge various forms of social 
inequalities, including those that prevailed among the population classified as poor.  
 
Kabeer’s contribution (2010) to this body of critiques provides the point of departure for this 
paper. She pointed out that the measurement of MDG achievements in terms of ‘proportions’ 
and ‘averages’ obscured the fact that certain sections of the poor were systematically left out 
of most forms of progress reported by their countries. Their excluded status reflected the 
intersection of multiple and overlapping inequalities which made them harder to reach than 
the rest of the population and gave their disadvantaged status an enduring quality, lasting 
over lifetimes and sometimes over generations.  
 
The SDG agenda shows clear signs of lessons learnt. It has a more in-depth understanding 
of some of the goals which featured in the MDGs and it includes a number of new goals.  
Most relevant for this paper is SDG 10 which is committed to reducing inequalities within and 
between countries. These include income inequalities as well as inequalities based on age, 
sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status within a country. 
This new commitment to inclusiveness is spelt out forcefully in the declaration of the 2030 
Agenda:  
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As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind. 
Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fundamental, we wish to see the Goals 
and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all segments of society. And we will 
endeavour to reach the furthest behind first. 1 
 
This is an ambitious agenda. It promises to address the distribution of income and wellbeing 
between the haves and the have-nots. It also promises to reach out to the socially excluded 
sections of ‘have-nots’ rather than opting for the ‘easy wins’ associated with targeting those 
who are easier to reach. There are clearly lessons to be learnt from countries that have made 
some progress in this direction.  Brazil stands out as one of these. It exemplifies key aspects 
of the intersecting inequalities outlined in Kabeer (2010) and indeed was used in the report 
to illustrate how they complicated claims about progress on the MDGs based on national 
averages. Yet since the early 2000s, Brazil has attracted international attention for its success 
in reducing both absolute poverty as well as income inequality.  What has been less well 
publicized is that it has also made progress in reducing intersecting inequalities.   
 
The objective of this paper is to explore the phenomenon of intersecting inequalities in the 
context of Brazil, to document their decline in recent years and to explore how and why this 
happened. Although the declines we will be studying belong within the period covered by the 
MDGs, we are linking our analysis to the SDG agenda because of its commitment to leaving 
no one behind.  We will be asking whether the Brazilian experience has lessons to offer for 
such an agenda.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The rest of Section 1 elaborates on the concept of 
intersecting inequalities and examines its manifestation in the Brazilian context.  Section 2 
provides a brief history of the evolution of these inequalities in the Brazilian context and 
documents its current manifestations. Section 3 uses national household survey data to track 
trends in key SDG-related socio-economic indicators between 2002 and 2013. It will draw on 
the relevant data sets from the Brazilian National Survey by Household Sampling (Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios, PNAD). This has been made public and freely available 
by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística, IBGE)2. It finds that not only have income poverty and inequality declined over 
this period but that there has also been a decline in intersecting inequalities. Sections 3 and 
4 draw on various bodies of literature to piece together an explanation for how and why this 
happened. Section 3 explores explanations that focus on economic and social policy during 
this period while Section 4 examines the politics of inclusion. Section 5 concludes by asking 
what the Brazilian experience offers by way of generalizable lessons.  
  
1.2 Conceptualizing intersecting inequalities  
 
There have been two broad approaches to the analysis of inequality within international 
development studies. The first revolves around inequality conceptualized in terms of income 
and measured at the individual/household level.  While the early focus on money-metric 
measures have been supplemented over time with more multidimensional approaches which 
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encompass inequalities in material assets and human capabilities, these continue to be 
measured at the level of individuals.  This has been termed a ‘vertical’ model of inequality as 
it is based on ranking individuals/households by their income, assets or human capabilities 
(Stewart, 2002).  
 
A second approach revolves around the phenomenon of social discrimination. It uses group-
based disadvantage as its entry point into the analysis of inequality where the inequality in 
question revolves around the social identity of different groups. This gives rise to what has 
been described as a ‘horizontal’ model of inequality (Stewart op cit) in that the groups in 
question cut across the different strata that make up the vertical model. Group-based 
inequalities are the product of cultural norms, values and practices which serve to routinely 
disparage, stereotype, exclude, ridicule and demean certain groups relative to others, 
denying them full personhood and the ability to participate as equal citizens in the life of their 
community.  The identities in question can take many different forms, but some are socially 
ascribed from birth, and hence more immutable and harder to shed than others. This, for 
instance, differentiates identities associated with gender, caste, race and ethnicity from those 
associated age and certain forms of disability.  
 
The two approaches to inequality thus focus on quite distinct axes of disadvantage: the 
distribution of resources and the devaluation of identity. It is possible to be economically 
deprived, to lack the means to meet basic needs, without necessarily being despised for it: 
this underpins the distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor. Similarly, it is 
possible to face social discrimination, without necessarily facing material deprivation.   
Gender, for instance, cuts across economic strata so that women tend to occupy a 
subordinate status relative to men within these different strata but they are fairly evenly 
distributed across the economic hierarchy. Gender is generally associated with discrimination 
but not necessarily with poverty.  
 
However, it is the intersection between these different forms of inequality that serves to define 
the most severe and often the most enduring form of social exclusion in societies.  Kabeer 
(2010) found that it was these groups who were over-represented at the bottom end of the 
income distribution and who reported the least progress in terms of the MDG indicators. She 
noted also that there were other dimensions to social exclusion that were not fully captured 
by the interplay between economic deprivation and social discrimination. Spatial inequalities 
often overlapped with intersecting inequalities: socially excluded groups were concentrated 
in the most disadvantaged locations – remote and challenging rural terrains or overcrowded 
slum neighbourhoods. These social, economic and spatial inequalities in turn contributed to 
political disenfranchisement: such groups were generally denied voice and influence in 
collective decisions that affected their lives.   
 
The language of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ inequalities is not always helpful in capturing what 
is at issue here because of the ‘grid-like’ symmetry evoked by these terms.  The intersection, 
rather than addition, of different forms of inequality, the fact that they reinforce and 
exacerbate each other, is better captured by the language of ‘sharp discontinuities’ and 
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‘intensifications’ which have been found to distinguish the poor from the poorest in many 
regions of the world (Lipton, 1983).  Thus while gender on its own does not signify poverty 
and social exclusion, the intersection of gender with income and other forms of inequality is 
generally associated with an intensification of disadvantage so that women and girls from 
poor and marginalized groups tend to be among the most excluded in their society.  
 
Brazil is a useful case study of intersecting inequalities for a number of reasons.  For much 
of the 20th century, Brazil has been one of the fastest growing economies of the world. Even 
between 1980 and 2000, when growth had slowed down, GDP per capita grew at an annual 
average rate of 2.5% (Mario and Woolcock, 2008). Yet its Gini coefficient remained among 
the highest in the world throughout this period and fairly constant at around 0.58 and 0.60.  
In addition, as will be discussed in the paper, it is clear that race, ethnicity, gender and 
location intersect with the income distribution in Brazil to produce distinct social and spatial 
patterns to poverty and inequality.   These intersecting inequalities are bound up with the 
history of colonization in the country and its subsequent efforts at economic development. 
Their recent declines can thus be seen as a break with a very long history. We turn in the 
next section to a brief summary of this history.   
 
Section 2: The evolution of intersecting inequalities in Brazil  
 
2.1  From ‘illiterate agro-export outpost’ to ‘conservative modernization’ 
 
Portuguese colonization of Brazil began around 1500 with the goal of exploiting its wealth 
and converting its population to Christianity. The colonizers carried the values of a strictly 
hierarchical society dominated by a hereditary monarch and aristocratic elite with them into 
their colony, regarding it as little more than an ‘illiterate agro-export outpost’ (Skidmore, 
2004). They began by enslaving the indigenous population to grow sugar but with the 
decimation of the population by war and disease, turned to the import of slaves from Africa, 
adding a further layer of ‘racially inferior people’ to an already highly stratified social hierarchy. 
There were around 3.6 million Africans by 1850 when the slave trade ended, more than 
anywhere else in the region. They were largely concentrated in the north and north-east of 
the country which had been the centre of the early plantation economy.  
 
The colonial settlers subsequently expanded into mining and cattle rearing and then to coffee. 
The country was under Portuguese rule for three centuries with very little experience of 
representative self-government (Skidmore, 2004).  It was governed by Crown-appointed 
governors-general and bureaucracies till its independence in 1822 when it declared itself an 
empire. While elections took place periodically in later years, voting was restricted to the small 
percentage of the population who were literate which, even in the 1920s, was just 25% of the 
population.  
 
One reason for these low levels of education was its suppression under colonialism and 
prohibition of printing (Skidmore, 2004. There were few schools and no universities. Only the 
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children of the very rich amongst the settlers gained entrance to school and, in the absence 
of universities, went to Portugal for their university education.  The first university was not 
founded till 1932. Consequently, even into the twentieth century, Brazil had the worst 
educational record of the major Latin American countries (Birdsall and Sabot 1996).  
 
The abolition of slavery in 1888 foregrounded two sets of concerns among the Brazilian elite. 
One was the disappearance of the pool of cheap, ‘unfree’ labour. The other was the fear that 
prevailing theories of scientific racism would lead European countries to look down on a 
country with such a large African and indigenous population. Both concerns were addressed 
through a strategy of subsidizing the large-scale immigration of European workers (but 
forbidding Asian immigration) who would not only add to the workforce but also ‘whiten’ the 
population and improve the physical and moral characteristics of the Brazilian people 
(Rezende and Lima, 2004).  This meant that the newly-freed slaves had to compete with 
European migrants on highly disadvantaged terms which relegated them to the poorest paid 
jobs in the economy.  
 
Brazil’s subsequent development strategy has been described as a process of ‘conservative 
modernization’ (Mario and Woolcock, 2008) entailing the selective incorporation of certain 
segments of the population into the modernizing sectors of the economy, society and the 
political system and the systematic exclusion of the rest. Until the 1930s, the economy was 
dominated by the agricultural sector largely based in the north. Its early efforts to industrialize 
were boosted by the Depression when a shortage of foreign exchange served to promote 
domestic manufacture of previously imported products.  By the 1950s, the country had 
embarked on a massive import substituting industrialization programme to end its 
dependence on foreign imports. The government led this process through a corporatist 
strategy intended to both promote industrialization and to manage the accompanying 
urbanization and unionization. It created a network of state enterprises to expand its role in 
the economy, used a large-scale labour bureaucracy to bring unions under its control and put 
in place generous pension schemes for federal government employees. 
 
Economic growth and industrialization in Brazil was constant and fast until the early 1980s. 
It was under military rule for much of this period (1964 to 1985). Economic success partly 
explained why the military was able to hold on to power for this length of time. However, this 
was also a period of widening economic inequalities. Industrialization was concentrated in 
São Paulo and other regions of South-East and South to the neglect of the north and north 
east. This emerging regional inequality mapped into a racial geography in that Afro-Brazilians 
were, and remained, concentrated in the northern region while the majority of whites were to 
be found in the increasingly prosperous south.  The neglect of agriculture meant that between 
1960 and 1980, more than 30 million people moved from the countryside into the cities in 
search of work (Mario and Woolcock, 2008).  For the better-educated workers and their 
families, the move into cities held out real prospects of upward mobility and material 
improvement.  But for the poorer majority, it meant finding work in the rapidly expanding 
informal economy with little hope of better prospects in the foreseeable future.  
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The 1980s saw a slow-down in growth rates accompanied by rising unemployment, high rates 
of inflation and further migration into urban areas. Recurrent economic crises gave rise to 
intensified political mobilization culminating in the end of military rule in 1985 followed by the 
first democratic election to be held in over two decades and the adoption of a progressive 
new constitution in 1988.  However, successive governments spent much of the decade that 
followed dealing with hyperinflation and low, sometimes, negative rates of growth. A number 
of policies directed towards the poor were put in place in the 1990s and while this led to some 
decline in poverty, income inequality did not show any sign of change until the start of the 
new century.  
 
2.2 Shifting constructions of inequality in the Brazilian context: vertical, horizontal and 
intersecting 
 
While racial inequality is closely bound up with income inequality in Brazil, the understanding 
of the relationship between the two has undergone a number of shifts over time.  This in turn 
reflects the shifting interpretations given to miscegenation, or racial mixture, as one of the 
defining characteristics of Brazilian society, within both official and popular constructions of 
national identity. The origins of miscegenation go back to the colonial period which was 
characterised by a high ratio of males to females among the Portuguese settler population 
combined with relatively unlimited sexual ‘access’ by Portuguese males to female slaves of 
Indigenous and African origin.  The result was a steady increase in the mixed race population.  
 
Scientific theories about the inferiority of the non-white races flourished in Europe and were 
incorporated into Brazilian colonial ideology. However, while the racial distinction in Brazil 
mapped onto a social distinction, it was blurred to some extent by the common practice of 
freeing the offspring of white males and black slave women. This gave rise to mulattos as an 
intermediate social category of ‘browns’ while ‘blacks’ continued to make up most of the slave 
population. This creation of what has been described as the ‘mulatto escape hatch’ (Degler, 
1971) was believed to have forestalled the development of rigid racial boundaries. Instead, it 
seems to have given rise to the conceptualization of race in terms of skin colour rather than 
descent and as a complicated and continuous rather than a simple, categorical variable.   
 
The complex understanding of the relationship between race and inequality in Brazil is clearly 
illustrated in the debates that ensued as earlier theories about racial inferiority gave way to 
more contested conceptualisations about how race fitted into the social structure.  The 
discussion of these debates as elaborated by Telles (2004), Skidmore (1992) and others 
echo the discussion about horizontal, vertical and intersecting inequalities that we started out 
with in this paper. We draw on this work to summarize the different positions in these debates. 
 
From horizontal to vertical inequality  
 
According to Telles (2004), the first generation of researchers to contribute to these 
debates began writing around the 1920s and sought to construct Brazil as a racial 
democracy in which race made no difference to status and opportunities.  They were largely 
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North Americans or had been trained in North America, carried out their research in the 
North-east of Brazil which had a largely Afro-Brazilian population and they focused their 
enquiry on horizontal relationships, the relationships between different racial groups. They 
stressed the fluidity of racial classifications, in marriage and in friendship between people of 
different races and colour and concluded that race was irrelevant to the social hierarchy. 
Any differences in social status by race that might exist were the legacy of slavery that had 
only recently been abolished and would diminish over time.  
 
The work of Gilberto Freyre (1933) was particularly influential in promoting this vision.  He 
argued that the overwhelmingly white elite had acquired valuable cultural assets from their 
intimate mixing with the African population whose culture he considered more evolved than 
indigenous Brazilians (Rezende and Lima, 2004).  He juxtaposed the figure of the master 
and slave, representing Portuguese and African culture, as the two basic poles that 
constituted Brazilian colonial society. ‘Brazilianness’ was the result of the productive fusion 
of two antagonistic cultures placed in a hierarchical relation to each other but in which 
opposites complemented each other harmoniously: ‘the European culture came into contact 
with the indigenous, softened by the oil of the African’ (cited in Rezende and Lima, p. 759). 
 
The claim that race was irrelevant to social mobility proved extremely useful to the 
conservative civil and military elites who ruled Brazil for much of the 20th century and was 
incorporated into their nationalist rhetoric as a means of staving off the possibility of racial 
unrest.  There was systematic avoidance of any mention of race by successive 
governments leading to a major lacuna in relevant data. While race had been included in 
the first census of 1872 and then in 1890, basic data collection between 1890 and 1940 
omitted all reference to racial categories (Skidmore, 1992).  
 
The second wave of scholarship, starting in the 1950s, were less concerned with the 
consequences of miscegenation and focused instead on vertical inequalities. These were 
mainly Brazilian scholars writing within a Marxist framework who researched the white-
dominated regions of the South and South east. They found a very different Brazil, with 
recent European migrants leapfrogging over blacks and mulattos in the labour market, 
pervasive prejudice and discrimination against non-white populations, rigid racial 
distinctions and limited social interactions between white people, on the one hand, and the 
black and brown population, on the other.  
 
However, they interpreted racial inequality as a manifestation of the vertical inequalities 
embedded in the class hierarchy. They argued that because the newly-freed black 
population had not been able to compete on equal terms with the influx of European 
immigrants that accompanied the abolition of slavery, they had been condemned to 
‘economic maladjustment, occupational regression, and social imbalance’ (Rezende and 
Lima, 2004: p. 761). The racial and ethnic specificities which gave rise to group-based 
inequalities which cut across class were largely ignored, providing the ideological 
justification for racially and ethnically blind national policies for poverty reduction. 
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From vertical to intersecting inequalities 
 
Much of this debate was carried out within historical and anthropological disciplines and relied 
on ‘soft’ data, a rich repertoire of laws, travellers’ accounts, memoirs, newspaper articles and 
detailed ethnographic accounts of different dimensions of relations among and within different 
racial categories but unable to establish whether race made a macro difference in social or 
economic outcomes.  Nor was it possible for other social scientists to do so. The harsh 
political repression that characterised the years of military rule had curtailed the scope for 
critical research, while the failure of official statistics to include race as a category made it 
even more difficult to investigate claims about group-based discrimination.   
 
Race was re-introduced into the census in 1950 and 1960 but could not be matched with 
socio-economic data (Skidmore, 1992). It was omitted again in the 1970 census and it was 
only in the face of vigorous protest from social scientists, sections of the press and an 
emerging group of Afro-Brazilian activists that it was included in the 1980 census. Restrictions 
began to ease and the 1976 PNAD was the first time that the government collected and 
published data on income and employment by race.  
 
The new generation of Afro-Brazilian activists had emerged in the 1970s to contest the myth 
of Brazil’s racial democracy and to protest police brutality, mistreatment by public officials 
and discrimination in the job market and public places.  While they did not enjoy broad 
support, their arguments were supported by third wave of scholarship that moved beyond 
constructions of race relations as either essentially democratic or racial inequality as an 
accidental feature of class to an analysis of racial and ethnic discrimination as independent 
of class, but exacerbating its effects.  This view of race was made possible by availability of 
new forms of data. These studies, some of which are summarized below, demonstrated that 
‘100 years after the abolition of slavery, Afro-Brazilians continued to dominate in the lowest 
economic strata’ (Lovell and Wood, 1998, p. 105).   
 
This was also a period that saw the beginning of attention to the gender as a further 
dimension of the intersection between class and racial inequality. A number of authors traced 
the collective struggles of Afro-Brazilian women to navigate their way through the race and 
class biases of the women’s movement and the patriarchal politics of the black movement in 
order to affirm blackness and femaleness as legitimate forms of self-identification (Caldwell,  
2007; Lovell, 2000).  
 
As Rezendo and Lima (2004) observed, Afro-Brazilian women had either been invisible in 
the debates around the nature of inequality in Brazil or they had been brought in to buttress 
particular positions. The work of Gilberto Freyre had located the birth of racial democracy in 
Brazil in the intimate structure of the plantation house and slave quarters which allowed 
miscegenation to take place under the aegis of the rural patriarchal family. Ascribing a near-
mythical status to the figure of the slave woman, he attributed any violence they had suffered 
to slavery.  Where gender was discussed in the class-based paradigm of inequality, women 
were simply part of the poor and uneducated black population who had failed to compete with 
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European immigrants for places in the labour market and were thus left with the most poorly 
skilled jobs. There was no specific reflection at this stage on the situation of black women. 
 
As Gonzalez (2008) points out, the significance assigned to miscegenation as the core of 
national identity, buttressing claims about racial democracy, served to ‘normalize and 
naturalize’ the idea of Afro-descendants as sex objects (in the case of mulatto women) and 
domestic servants (in the case of darker women), ‘the necessary physical providers of 
pleasure, comfort and altruism’ (p. 223). As a result, as Caldwell (2007) argues, Afro-Brazilian 
women are positioned as “the altruistic caretakers of white Brazilians, rather than full citizens 
and equal participants in Brazilian national culture” (77). Feminists have noted that black 
women’s experience was marked not only by backbreaking domestic and farm labour 
associated with their status as slaves but also by ‘mandatory gender-related functions’: 
‘mammies nursing the children of the white plantation family, the masters’ sexual satisfaction, 
the young boys’ sexual initiation’ (Rezendo and Lima, p. 760).  Feminist scholarship has 
drawn attention to how the legacy of this history can still be seen in the occupational structure 
of the Brazilian economy which relegates a significant proportion of paid domestic service to 
indigenous and Afro-descendant women.  
 
Documenting intersecting inequalities in late 20th century  
 
There is now a considerable body of studies documenting how the intersection of inequalities 
are reflected in different measures of poverty and wellbeing.  Most use national survey data 
and hence their classifications to capture racial/ethnic identity.  Since 1950, the Brazilian 
census has used colour to capture racial/ethnic distinctions.  There are five main categories: 
white or branco who are Euro-descendants; yellow or amarelo, who are descended from 
Japanese and Korean migrants); brown or pardo who are dual/multiple descendants from 
European and African/indigenous people and preto, the Afro-descendants. The category 
indigena or indigenous people was only added in 1991. Because of the very small 
percentages of the population who are indigenous or yellow (less than 1% in each case), 
most studies tend to distinguish between white (including yellow), brown and black (including 
indigenous) or just white and non-white.  We draw on some of these studies to illustrate how 
intersecting inequalities played out in the Brazilian context in the late 20th century.  
 
A first set of findings confirm the marked racial dimension to poverty and inequality. Afro-
descendants made up approximately 45% of the Brazilian population in 2000: between 1995 
and 2000, they earned around half of the average income of the white population, a proportion 
that remained stable over this period. A comparison of the racial composition of income 
deciles showed that it became increasingly ‘blacker’ with the move from higher to lower 
income deciles. Black households made up 20% in the highest income decile and increased 
systematically as income declined so that they made up 70% in the lowest income decile 
(Marió and Woolcock, 2004: page 16).  
 
Racial inequalities were evident in health and education. White life expectancy at birth in 
1950 was 47.5 compared to black life expectancy of 40.1. The gap of around 7 years 
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remained the same in 1980 when life expectancies had risen to 66.1 and 59.4 respectively 
(Lovell and Wood, 1998). These differences in life expectancy declined with income level – 
from 8.59 at the lower end of the income distribution to 2.28 at the highest level.  Blacks also 
lagged behind in education: primary school enrolment rates for whites was 0.93 and 0.87 in 
blacks in 1995 but there had been considerable closing of disparities at the level of schooling 
by 2002 with rates of 0.97 for white and 0.95 for blacks.  
 
A second set of findings attested to the overlap between the racial and spatial distribution of 
poverty.   It noted that eight of the ten poorest states were in the north east, which had the 
highest concentrations of Afro-descendants, while three of the four states in the south east 
were among the five richest in the country. Nearly 50% of the poor live in the Northeast region 
although they represent only 30% of the total population. The racial differences in life 
expectancy at birth noted earlier varied by region. In addition, while the relationship between 
racial differentials and income levels held across the northern and southern regions of the 
country, and overall differentials were larger in the poorer north, the relationship was also 
flatter: it was 7.10 years among high income groups in the north compared to 8.41 in the 
south.   
 
There was also a rural-urban dimension to poverty.  Nearly 55% of the poor live in rural or 
small urban areas although they account for 35% of the population.  Among the poor, the 
majority are found among farm households located in remote, isolated, sparsely populated 
and low productivity areas and largely depend on farming and agricultural labor. They are 
mainly indigenous (Mario and Woolcock, 2004).  
 
A third set of studies documented the intersection of inequalities in the labor market. Lovell 
and Wood (1998) compared the situation in 1960 and 1980. They found an occupational 
structure that was highly stratified by race, class and gender, both between better paid white 
collar and less well-paid blue collar jobs but also within these broad categories.  In 1960, 88% 
of black women were in blue collar jobs compared to 35% of white women. Most of the black 
women were in the least well-paid and lowest status unskilled manual and personal service 
categories (74%) and mainly in domestic service (68%). White women in white collar jobs 
were evenly distributed between professional/technical and clerical jobs. Barely any had 
managerial positions.  
 
In 1980, 66% of black women were still in blue collar jobs but while 44% were in 
unskilled/personal services, the rest had moved into skilled manual labor. The percentage of 
black women in white collar jobs had increased from 12% to 34%, mainly in 
professional/technical and clerical.  White women had also increased their share of white 
collar jobs from 48% to 63% but had not made it into managerial /administrative positions.  
 
As far as men were concerned, 82% of black and 62% of white were in blue collar jobs but 
with more black men in skilled manual work than white (71% and 50%). Similar percentages 
of both were in unskilled services.  37% of white men and only 17% of black men were in 
white collar jobs but only white men had managerial positions. By 1980, 46% of white men 
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and 25% of black men were in white collar jobs, including 9.6% and 3.4% in 
managerial/administrative jobs respectively.  Of the rest in blue collar jobs, the vast majority 
in both ethno-racial categories were in skilled manual jobs.  
 
The occupational gains reported by both men and women in the two groups reflected the 
expansion of the economy between 1960 and 1980 and the accompanying urbanization of 
the work force. What can be seen is that, despite expansion of education and opportunities, 
the black population remained concentrated at the lower ranks of the occupational hierarchy, 
with black women in particular concentrated in domestic service.  
 
Comparison of average monthly wages in 1980 established that white collar jobs paid 
considerably higher wages than blue collar ones and that unskilled/personal services were 
the least well-paid of all occupations. Furthermore, white men and women earned more than 
black men and women respectively in each occupational category while black women earned 
less than black men in each of these occupational categories. For example, focusing on 
unskilled/personal services, the lowest paid occupational category, white men earned 
8917BRL1 in 1980, black men earned 6892 real, white women earned 4165 BRL while black 
women earned 3715 BRL.   
 
Later studies testified to the persistence of the race/gender hierarchy in the labor market. 
Analysis of 1996 PNAD data showed that 64.6% of white women and 68.7% of black women 
earned less than the monthly minimum wage compared to just 24.2% of white men and 34.5% 
of black men( Mario and Woolcock, 2004). Similarly, the rise in earnings associated with 
education was much steeper for white men than other groups in both 1992 and 2000. For 
each level of education, the highest earnings were reported by white men and the lowest by 
black women. Earnings were very similar for white women and black men at lower levels of 
education but were lower for white women than black women for 11 years of schooling or 
more.  
 
Rezendo and Lima cite work by Telles (1990) who examined the importance of education, 
gender, age, race, and migratory status for the occupational distribution of workers in the 
greater metropolitan areas of Brazil and found that gender explained the greatest share of 
variation in the composition of the informal market. Black women were especially prone to 
having jobs in the informal sector, even more than would be expected based on the single 
effects of race or gender, indicating the existence of particularly severe discrimination against 
non-white women.  
 
To sum up, studies of labour market inequalities have consistently found white men at the 
top of the occupational hierarchy and black women at the bottom. Black men, on the other 
hand, often appear to do better than white women. These studies also confirm the continued 
concentration of black women in domestic work (Bruschini, 2000; Lima 2001).  As analysis 
of the 1998 PNAD reports, 36.8% of black women and 27.4% of brown women were still in 
                                                          
1
 BRL refers to the Brazilian Real, the country’s currency. 
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domestic work. If the ‘personal services category’ was added, then 47.8% of black women in 
urban Brazil in 1998 were concentrated in these two occupational categories, often with the 
worst conditions in terms of income and working conditions (Rezende and Lima).  
 
The data cited so far attest to the significance of intersecting inequalities in determining how 
different gender/race groups are positioned in vertical hierarchies of income, life expectancy, 
education and wages.  But before we conclude this section, it is important to note that there 
is also empirical evidence to support some of the claims made in relation to racial democracy 
in Brazil. This has led some to refer to ‘Brazil-style racism’ (Mario and Woolcock) to 
differentiate it from the more clear-cut racism of the US and South Africa, the two countries 
most often used as comparators.  We summarize evidence on the three examples of this 
discussed in Telles (2004).  
 
The first example relates to ambiguity around racial classification.  As we noted, official 
statistics classify the population by colour, using 5 categories and relying on self-identification 
by respondents. Studies have suggested that the population itself has a much richer 
vocabulary to capture various gradations in colour than these five. One survey in 1976, for 
instance, which asked an open-ended question about colour, recorded over 100 terms. 
However, a re-analysis of the data suggested that in fact, over 95% of the respondents opted 
for one of six terms (variations on black, brown and white) with those using other terms (such 
as purple, dark chocolate and Pele-coloured) were used by just three or four people.  
 
More indicative of the fluidity around racial classification are some of the discrepancies 
observed by studies. One example of this relates to discrepancies in how people choose to 
classify themselves. Self-classification as well as classification by others will often reflect 
some combination of skin colour, appearance and social status so that that individuals with 
the same skin tone may classify themselves and be classified differently according to social 
status. Also the same person may classify themselves differently over time: changes in self-
reclassification between censuses accounted for some of the changes in the racial 
composition of the population documented at the national level (Lovell and Wood, 1998).  
 
Telles notes the particular ambiguity surrounding the ‘brown’ category who, along with the 
official label of pardo, are also referred to as moreno. In his analysis of 1995 data, he found 
that those who had classified themselves as moreno in response to the open-ended question 
distributed themselves between white, brown and black categories when asked to use the 
census categories. There was also considerable discrepancy between self and interviewer 
identification using the census categories.  There appeared to be least ambiguity for those 
with higher education and at the lighter end of the colour scale. For instance, there was near-
perfect consistency (98%) between interviewer classification among highly educated men 
and women in the South who classified themselves as white, and only slightly lower for this 
group in the north (93-94%). At the other end of the colour continuum, blacks were more likely 
to encounter discrepancies than either whites or browns for both higher and less educated 
groups but ambiguities appeared to be largest for more educated black women, particularly 
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in Bahia where there was only 22% likelihood that interviewer would classify highly educated 
women as black.  
 
A second form of evidence that appeared to support the idea of a racial democracy related 
to residential segregation. We have already noted the existence of a spatial geography of 
race which creates concentrations of whites in the more affluent southern states and of blacks 
in the poorer north and northeast.  However, there has been considerable racial convergence 
in urban areas: while 51% of white, 42% of blacks and 37% of browns lived in urban areas in 
1960, this had increased to 84%, 80% and 74% respectively by 1990.  Examining residential 
patterns in two large urban areas in the South, Telles found considerable evidence of 
overlapping racial and class segregation: whites were concentrated in the most affluent 
central districts while non-whites were found in the poorer outer districts.  
 
However, a more complicated picture emerged at neighbourhood level. Here Telles used a 
dissimilarity index (DI) which measured evenness in the distribution of racial and household 
income groups across a given neighbourhood and an exposure index (EI) which measured 
the extent to which members of a certain social group are exposed to those of another group 
by virtue of living in the same neighbourhood).  The two are not the same: it is possible for 
whites to be more exposed to blacks in neighbourhoods where blacks are a majority but this 
has no bearing on the dissimilarity index.  
 
He found that the DI for the ten largest metropolitan areas in Brazil varied from a low of 37 to 
a high of 48. These are very much lower than estimates varying from 75 to 93 in the ten 
largest metropolitan areas in the US. The EI index ranged from 12 to 59 in Brazil while it 
varied from 4 to 12 in the US.  In other words, white Brazilians were far more likely to live in 
racially mixed neighbourhoods than are US whites and far more likely to be exposed to black 
people.  
 
Residential segregation by race appeared to increase by income, suggesting that higher 
income whites were less likely to live in racially mixed neighbourhoods.  This probably 
reflected the greater ability of wealthier whites to use the formal housing market to select 
residence by colour than poorer whites who gained access to housing through informal 
markets. In other words, the lower levels of racial segregation in poorer neighbourhoods is 
less likely to reflect greater tolerance among the poor as it is the precarious housing situation 
of those ‘who have little control or concern over the colour of their neighbours’ 
 
Following on from Brazil’s lower levels of segregation is a third example of what makes race 
in Brazil different which is the ‘relatively high levels of racial interaction, including interracial 
friendship and intermarriage, at least among the poor’ (Telles, p. 213). This was evident in 
the data on inter-racial marriage. Data from 1991 suggested that 23% of marriages in Brazil 
were between of different colours, a much higher percentage than found in other racially 
structured societies like USA and South Africa.  While this is indicative of fairly widespread 
inter-racial sociability, it is also the case that intermarriage by whites is mainly with mulattoes. 
Despite the fact that brown and black people are closer to each other in the vertical 
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distribution of opportunities, there is greater social acceptance of marriage between whites 
and mulatto. This appears to reflect the preference for lighter rather than darker skin colour 
in the marriage market in Brazil. An important factor in inter-racial marriage in Brazil is 
interracial propinquity. As a result, intermarriage occurs mostly in the North east where whites 
are more likely to interact with browns and blacks.  Similarly, it is most prevalent among poor 
whites who are also most likely to be exposed to non-whites. It is less common among middle 
class whites.   
 
Section 3: Leaving no one behind? Trends in intersecting inequalities 
2002-2013 
 
Bearing in mind these intersecting patterns of inequality in the closing decades of the 20th 
century, we turn our attention to the early decades of the 21st.  As we pointed out in the 
introduction, this paper is motivated by the apparent break with history, evidence of 
declining inequality since 2000 in a country that has historically been characterized by high, 
and remarkably stable, measures of income inequality.  This section of the report uses 
PNAD data to unpack some of the components that make up this historical reversal and to 
explore in greater detail how groups that had hitherto been left behind in the country’s 
progress have fared in an era of declining income inequality.  We organize our analysis 
around the SDG indicators as a way of linking it to the larger development agenda but are 
only able to focus on those indicators for which we have data.  
 
At the start of the period under analysis, Brazil’s population was estimated by PNAD to be 
175 million people (of which 51.2% were female) growing to 201 million people (51.4% 
female) by 2013. 
 
Table 3.1 Brazilian demographics – ethno-racial groups 
 White Yellow Black Mixed Indigenous 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Brazil 53.2% 46.3% 0.4% 0.5% 5.6% 8.0% 40.5% 45.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
North 27.6% 22.6% 0.2% 0.3% 4.7% 7.4% 67.3% 68.1% 0.2% 1.5% 
Northeast 30.2% 27.4% 0.2% 0.2% 5.5% 9.6% 63.8% 62.4% 0.2% 0.4% 
Southeast 63.2% 54.3% 0.6% 0.6% 6.7% 8.6% 29.4% 36.4% 0.1% 0.1% 
South 82.7% 76.4% 0.4% 0.5% 3.7% 4.0% 13.1% 18.9% 0.2% 0.2% 
Centre-West 44.7% 39.5% 0.5% 0.5% 3.9% 6.6% 50.2% 53.1% 0.6% 0.2% 
Federal District 44.1% 44.1% 0.4% 0.6% 5.8% 7.6% 49.3% 47.4% 0.3% 0.3% 
 
As Table 3.1 indicates, the Brazilian population is largely made up of ‘whites’ and ‘mixed’ 
groups (53% and 40.5% respectively in 2002).  ‘Blacks’ made up 5.6%. The share of those 
classified as ‘yellow’ and ‘indigenous’ are extremely small (0.4% and 0.3% respectively).  
During the period under study, there is evidence of a reduction in share of the white 
population at the national level (46.3% in 2013) and in the different regions (with the exception 
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of country’s administrative centre, the Federal District of Brasilia, where it remained 
unchanged).  This was accompanied by an increase in the share of blacks (8%) and mixed 
groups (45%). We also note that population was and remained more white/yellow in the south 
and south east regions over this period with greater evidence of mixed groups/indigenous 
groups in the North and North-east.  Blacks appear to be more geographically dispersed 
although they made up 9.6% of North east by 2013.  
 
A preliminary analysis of socio-economic indicators led us to group the white and yellow 
populations together and those classified as black and mixed together. ‘Indigenous’ 
Brazilians are usually grouped together with blacks but they show significantly different 
values for their socio-economic indicators, suggesting that they should be object of specific 
attention. While representing only 0.3% of the Brazilian population in 2013, they do represent 
689,000 people, larger than the populations of several countries in the world.  
 
3.1 Income inequalities  
 
We start our discussion with income inequality, the main focus of SDG 10.  Table 3.2 reports 
on three measures in income inequality at the national level:  
 
- the better known Gini Index  
- the Palma Index (ratio of the 10% highest income bracket of the population's share of 
total reported income divided by the poorest 40%'s share) 
- Theil’s Generalized Entropy GE(2) measure (additively decomposes total inequality 
into between group inequality and within group inequality).  
 
Table 3.2 Indicators of income inequality 
Vertical Inequality Income 2002 2013 
Palma Index 47.9 36.0 
Gini Index 0.731 0.652 
GE (2) 3.237 2.191 
 
All three measures confirm there has been a significant decline in income inequality. Figure 
3.1 disaggregates this overall picture by income group. It suggests that while average income 
rose by 9.5% per annum between 2002 and 2013, the rate of growth was not evenly 
distributed across the income distribution. It was lower for the bottom 10% of the income 
distribution, much higher for those in the 10-30% and 30-50% income groups and then 
declined steadily at higher levels of income. While this picture is consistent with the picture 
painted by the vertical inequality indicators, it does suggest that the lowest income group did 
not benefit as much from the improvements in income experienced by the poorer half of the 
population. 
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Figure 3.1 Average yearly growth in income 
 
 
Figure 3.2 examines how the rates of change in average monthly income varied by gender, 
race and region. It suggests that average monthly income grew faster for women than for 
men by 1.7 percentage points but that the absolute difference in incomes also grew - from 
around 300 BRL a month in 2002 to around 500 BRL in 2013.   
 
A broadly similar pattern is evident for the two major ethno-racial categories: average monthly 
income grew faster for the poorer black population than the higher-income white although 
once again, absolute differences in income grew from 345 BRL in 2002 to 643 BRL in 2013.  
Growth rates were lowest for the indigenous minority and their income levels fell below black 
earnings in 2013.    
 
The regional trends are more complicated. It is clear that the Federal District reported 
considerably higher monthly incomes in both 2002 and 2013. Despite somewhat higher rates 
of growth in some of the less affluent districts, the absolute difference in monthly income in 
the Federal District and the North east, the poorest in both years, grew from 568 BRL in 2002 
to 1422 BRL in 2013. Rates of growth were lowest in the North, the second poorest region in 
both years.   
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Figure 3.2 Changes in average monthly income by gender, ethno-racial group and 
region 
 
 
In Table 3.2, we present three different indices which synthesize group inequalities 
(Gisselquist, 2015). The Group Weighted Coefficient of Variation (GWCOV) is a common 
measure of regional disparities. Weighted by the population size of each group, the GWCOV 
is less sensitive to changes in the relative position of smaller groups, because they receive a 
lower weight in the sum, relative to larger groups (Mancini, 2008). The second indicator is the 
Group Weighted Gini Index (GWGini) which, like the standard Gini Index, measures the 
pairwise weighted sum of differences between the average group measures for the indicator 
of interest, divided by the overall average. It is more sensitive to changes in relative positions 
around the population (or sample) mean. The third indicator is the Group Weighted Theil 
Index (GWTheil) which, as highlighted by Gisselquist (2015), is the most sensitive to the lower 
end of the distribution. The technical explanation of these indicators is provided in the 
Appendix.  
  
Table 3.3 below presents the values of the three group-based inequality indicators for three 
groups: gender, ethno-racial identity (Indigenous, White and Yellow, Black and Mixed) and 
region (Northeast, North, Centre-West, South, Southeast and Federal District). All three 
indicators tell us that, along with overall declines in income inequalities between 2002 and 
2013 depicted in Table 3.2, there have been declines in gender, ethno-racial and regional 
inequalities income.  At the same time, they tell us that ethno-racial income inequalities were 
and remain larger than income inequalities by gender or region.  
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Table 3.3: Indicators of group-based income inequalities 
 
Income Inequalities Gender Ethnic Regional 
Group weighted… 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Coeff. of Variation 0.338 0.256 0.567 0.406 0.250 0.229 
Gini 0.169 0.128 0.175 0.147 0.159 0.134 
Theil 0.062 0.036 0.061 0.045 0.044 0.034 
 
Figure 3.3 gives us a more disaggregated picture of the changes in average monthly income 
for groups at the intersection of gender, ethno-racial identity and region, with the different 
groups ranked by their income levels in 2002.  A broad reading of the figure suggests that 
average income increased over this period for each of these groups with largely similar 
ranking in both years, with black/brown and indigenous men and women at the lower end of 
the income distribution and white/yellow males at the higher end. While there are some 
exceptions in the case of a number of non-representative groups (such as indigenous women 
resident in the Centre-West region and indigenous men resident in the Federal district), it is 
worth noting that black/brown women from the Northeast earned the lowest monthly income 
in both 2002 and 2013 while white/yellow men from the Federal District earned the highest.  
Thus, while group-level indices suggest that inequalities are higher by ethno-racial identity 
than by gender, the intersection of race and gender creates what appears to be a fairly 
consistent income hierarchy by gender and race.  The other point to note is the relative 
flattening of the income curve – the average income gradient between groups reduced from 
7.9% in 2002 to 6.6% in 2013, despite an increase in the absolute difference between lowest 
and highest average group income.   
 
Figure 3.3  
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Figure 3.4 offers further insight into the hierarchies defined by intersecting inequalities. Using 
the idea of the Palma Index it displays the deviation of the share of the population and of 
income of the different intersecting groups for 2002 and 2013. The deviation is positive for 
groups whose share of income exceeded their share of total population and negative for 
those whose share of income was lower than their share of the population. Positive deviations 
are largest for white/yellow men from the South East followed by those from the South and 
the Centre-West. Negative deviations are largest for black/brown women from the Northeast, 
followed by black/brown women from the South and black/brown men from the Northeast.  
The shaded area shows all cases where the absolute deviation declined, in other words, the 
cases where the share of income came closer to share of population, leading to a more 
equitable distribution of income. The figure suggests that this was the case for many groups 
(53% of the groups to be exact), including the most extreme ones, although the positive 
deviation remains still very high for the most privileged groups (white/yellow men residing in 
the Southeast). It also suggests a significant concentration of groups in a window where the 
difference between share of income and share of population does not exceed 1% - a 
suggestion that these groups, on average, are not driving group-based inequalities. In fact, 
the proportion of such groups increased from 75%to 81% of the total.  
 
Figure 3.4 
 
 
To sum up this section, we have shown that economic growth in Brazil, from 2002 to 2013 
was accompanied not only by a decrease of vertical income inequality, but also in horizontal 
and intersecting inequalities. There has been a decline in regional inequalities in the income 
distribution, in gender inequalities as well as ethno-racial inequalities. However, it is important 
to note that the decline in ethno-racial inequalities does not include the indigenous population 
whose incomes do not appear to be converging towards the average.  While an examination 
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of horizontal inequalities suggests that ethno-racial inequality is higher than gender-based 
inequality, re-examining income distribution from an intersectional perspective suggests 
women from marginalized ethno-racial groups are clustered around the lower levels of the 
income distribution, despite a higher proportional increase in their respective average 
incomes. The suggestion is therefore, of a possible narrowing of identity-based differences 
in income due to a more than proportional increase of the income “floor” but not to higher 
socio-economic mobility. 
 
3.2 Poverty  
 
We turn next to the distribution of poverty across the population. SDG 1 suggests attention 
to ‘the proportion of the population below the international poverty line, disaggregated by sex, 
age group, employment status and geographical location (urban/rural)”.  Figure 3.5 compares 
BRL estimates of different poverty lines between 2002 and 2016.  It shows a near-perfect 
coincidence between the International (Extreme) Poverty Line (IPL) set by the World Bank 
and Brazil’s National Extreme Poverty Line. By contrast, Brazil’s National Poverty Line (NPL) 
is set higher. In our analysis therefore we will focus on extreme poverty as measured by the 
IPL and overall poverty as set by the NPL. 
 
Figure 3.6 examines the incidence of extreme and overall poverty for different income groups 
between 2002 and 2013.  It suggests that extreme as well as overall poverty were 
concentrated in the lowest 10% of the income distribution in both 2002 and 2013 and both 
forms of poverty declined over this period. 78% of this group were below the poverty line in 
2002 declining to 18% in 2013. In addition, we should note that around 37% of the population 
aged 10+ earned zero income in 2002, a figure that declined to 30% in 2013.  
 
Figure 3.5  
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Figure 3.6 Poverty by income groups  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Incidence of poverty by gender 
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Figure 3.8 Incidence of poverty by ethno-racial group 
 
 
Figure 3.7 shows that, along with the overall decline in poverty, there was a clear decline in 
the gender gap in the incidence of poverty. While the percentage of men below the extreme 
poverty line declined from 23% in 2002 to 21% in 2013, the percentage of women declined 
from 39.6 to 29.4 percent. Nevertheless, women were still 8% more likely than men to earn 
less than US$1.25 a day in 2013. 
   
Figure 3.8 reports on the incidence of poverty by ethno-racial groups in 2002 and 2013.  
There appears to have been a decline in the incidence of poverty for each group so that the 
gap between the black/brown and indigenous groups declined vis-à-vis white/yellow groups. 
 
Table 3.4 compares the incidence of extreme poverty between 2002 and 2013 for groups at 
the intersection of income, gender and ethno-racial inequalities, focusing on those at the 
bottom 10% of the income distribution. It finds that there was a significant decline in extreme 
poverty for all groups over this period, with particularly large declines for indigenous males 
and females. Nevertheless, indigenous men and women continued to face the highest levels 
of deprivation in 2013 as they had in 2002, with incidence slightly higher among indigenous 
men.  
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Table 3.4 
Below 10% income 
level 
Below Extreme 
Poverty Line 
2002 2013 
Indigenous Male 75% 15% 
Indigenous Female 70% 12% 
Black & Mixed Male 62% 8% 
Black & Mixed Female 61% 7% 
White & Yellow Male 61% 7% 
White & Yellow Female 58% 7% 
 
Figure 3.9 Incidence of poverty by rural urban locations  
 
 
The next set of estimates examines spatial dimension of poverty in Brazil. Figure 3.9 suggests 
declines in poverty in both rural and urban areas with a faster decline in the proportion of 
rural poor (from 37% to 28.1%) compared to the urban (from 30.5% to 24.7%). This period 
therefore saw a reduction in the rural-urban poverty gap. 
  
Figure 3.10 shows the regional distribution of poverty. It suggests that while the incidence of 
poverty went down in all regions, this did not necessarily reduce regional inequalities in 
poverty. While the largest reduction in poverty was reported by Northeast region, which had 
been the poorest in 2002, the second largest declines occurred in the South region which 
had been the richest region in 2002. Smaller declines in the North, which had been second 
poorest region in 2002, meant that it became the poorest region in 2013. The South region 
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was the richest region in 2002 and remained so 2013. The difference in the incidence of 
poverty in the region with highest levels of extreme poverty (North in 2013) and the region 
with the lowest (South) thus increased in 2013.  
 
Figure 3.10 The incidence of poverty by region 
 
 
In summary, our analysis suggests that along with a reduction in absolute forms of poverty in 
Brazil, the poverty gap between different groups also declined. This decline was evident by 
gender, by ethno-racial groups and among groups at the intersection of gender, ethno-racial 
inequality and extreme poverty. There was a particularly large decline in extreme poverty 
among indigenous groups. The regional distribution of poverty is more complicated. While 
there was a reduction in the rural-urban gap in the incidence of poverty and while poverty 
went down in all regions, regional inequalities in poverty may have increased. Smaller 
declines in poverty in the North, which had been second poorest region in 2002 (behind the 
Northeast), made it the poorest region in 2013 and increased the gap with the richest region, 
the South. 
 
3.3 Labour market outcomes  
 
Wage inequalities 
 
We next turn to labour market outcomes in 2002 and 2013. We start by wage earnings, one 
of the indicators of progress included under SDG 8.  Given that wages represented 87% of 
reported incomes in 2002 and 90% in 2013 according to PNAD surveys, it is not surprising 
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that our estimates closely follow those reported for overall income.  Figure 3.11 examines 
growth in wages by gender, ethno-racial identity and region.  Wages grew by an average of 
9.6 per annum over our study period, rising somewhat faster for women than men (10.4% 
and 9.3 respectively) although women continued to earn lower wages in 2013.   
 
The table suggests some decline in ethno-racial inequalities in earnings in that growth in 
wages were highest for black and mixed groups (11.1%), followed by indigenous groups 
(9.9%), and then followed closely by white and yellow groups (9.6%). Wage levels, however, 
remained considerably higher for white/yellow groups (BRL 701 and 1920 in 2002 and 2013 
respectively), particularly compared to those reported by indigenous groups (BRL 326 and 
924).   
 
As far as regional disparities were concerned, the slowest rate of growth was reported by the 
North and the highest by the Northeast, but earnings in both 2002 and 2013 were somewhat 
higher in the North than in the North-East which reported the lowest earnings in both years. 
The Centre and Southern regions reported growth rates that varied between 8-10% but 
reported higher earnings than the northern regions in both years. The highest earnings, 
considerably higher than other regions, were reported by the Federal District for both years. 
 
Figure 3.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III Working paper 14                                                     Naila Kabeer and Ricardo Santos 
 
29 
 
Table 3.5 Measures of group-based, regional and intersecting wage 
inequalities 
Wage Inequalities Gender Ethnic Regional Intersecting 
Group weighted… 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Coeff. of Variation 0.221 0.173 0.527 0.385 0.265 0.231 0.507 0.573 
Gini 0.109 0.085 0.167 0.141 0.179 0.139 0.270 0.300 
Theil -0.017 -0.014 0.053 0.037 0.057 0.026 0.076 0.456 
 
Table 3.5 estimates indices of wage inequality by gender, ethno-racial groups, region and the 
intersection of these. The final column needs some explanation.  It calculates indicators of 
group weighted inequalities for a greater disaggregation, intersecting the three identities: 
gender, ethnic and regional. This allows us to highlight the differences between intersecting 
categories such as ‘white/yellow men from the south east’, ‘black/mixed women from the 
north-east’ or ‘indigenous women from the Centre-west’.  
 
The tables suggest that, as with income, ethno-racial wage inequalities are generally larger 
than inequalities by gender and region but it also suggests the intersection of these 
inequalities is associated with the greatest wage inequalities. There has been a decline for 
the group and regional measures of inequality. We also find some suggestion of increasing 
wage inequalities, particularly when the indicator is more sensitive to the extremes of the 
income distribution, such as is the case of the GWTheil. We will explore this finding through 
a further examination of labour market dynamics.   
 
Labour market segregation by occupation and work status  
 
We turn now to the distribution of occupations across different groups and regions.  Table 
3.6 summarizes the average monthly wages in BRL by occupation in 2002 and 2013 
ranked by average wage levels in 2013.  It makes a number of points. First of all, 
occupations at the higher end of the wage distribution generally reported a slow rate of 
growth per annum than those at the lower end, leading to some convergence to the national 
mean.  The exception to this pattern is the category ‘education, health and social services’ 
which grew at 10.4% compared to the 8-9% rates reported for other occupations in the 
higher end of the table. Secondly, jobs in public administration reported higher average 
wages than all other occupations in both 2002 and 2013 (with the exception of ‘other 
activities in 2002’). The third point to note is that agriculture and domestic services were the 
lowest paid jobs in both 2002 and 2013 as they had been the case in the earlier year. 
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Table 3.6 Average monthly wages by occupation  
Occupations 2002 2013 YΔ% 
Public Administration 1,033.9 2,747.8 9.3% 
Other industrial activities 970.4 2,611.6 9.4% 
Other Activities 1,075.6 2,496.3 8.0% 
Education, Health and Social Services 768.9 2,285.0 10.4% 
Transport, Storage and Communications 760.8 1,770.7 8.0% 
Manufacturing 617.3 1,519.8 8.5% 
Other collective, social and personal services 522.7 1,397.2 9.3% 
Trade and Repairs 574.3 1,393.7 8.4% 
Construction 482.2 1,371.4 10.0% 
Underdefined Activities 348.2 1,170.0 11.6% 
Accommodation and Food 419.7 1,169.0 9.8% 
Agriculture 177.1 796.5 14.6% 
Domestic Services 205.5 685.1 11.6% 
 
Table 3.7 reports on the distribution of different groupings across the occupational hierarchy.  
The upper half of the table presents simple ratios to capture the class, gender, ethno-racial 
and rural-urban inequalities in the distribution of occupations. The lower half tries to capture 
how the intersection of these inequalities maps onto the distribution of occupations.  
 
In the upper half of the table, the ratio of the poorest 40% of the population to the richest 10% 
captures the class distribution across occupations. The table tells us that poorer workers are 
severely under-represented at the higher paid end of the occupational hierarchy and over-
represented at the poorer paid end, particularly in agriculture and domestic services.  The 
ratio of female to male workers suggests greater parity in gender distribution at the better 
paid end, with women outnumbering men in the education, health and social services to a 
markedly greater extent in domestic services at the poorer end – a reminder that, despite of 
gender segmentation in the occupational structure, women are distributed across the class 
spectrum.  The ratio of black, mixed and indigenous workers to white/yellow workers 
suggests some under-representation in better-paid occupations, parity in others and over-
representation in yet others. As might be expected, the rural population is under-represented 
in most occupations but heavily represented in agriculture. 
 
The lower half of the table which takes account of intersecting inequalities offers clearer 
insights into the distribution of disadvantage in the labour market.  It compares the ratio of 
men and women from different ethno-racial categories from the poorest end of the income 
distribution (10-30%) to men from the privileged white/yellow ethno-racial categories from the 
top 10% of the income distribution.  Predictably, both men and women from the poorer end 
of the income distribution are severely under-represented in the better—paid occupations 
(such as public administration and health, education and social services which are dominated 
by wealthy men from the privileged ethno-racial groups. There is, however, some variation in 
the occupational distribution among poorer men and women from different ethno-racial 
categories.  Poorer men from all ethno-racial categories are over-represented in construction 
compared to privilege white/yellow men while poorer women are under-represented. Poorer 
white/yellow and black/mixed men are over-represented in the ‘undefined activities’. All the 
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poorer groups are over-represented in agriculture relative to privileged white/yellow men and 
in domestic services but poorer women from white/yellow and black/brown categories are 
heavily over-represented in this category.   
 
Some of the changes between 2002 and 2013 are worth noting: some increase in 
representation of poorer yellow/white and black/mixed women in ‘other social services’ (but 
a decline among indigenous women); some increase in representation of poorer white/yellow 
male in construction (but a decline among indigenous men), a large decline in representation 
of white/yellow as well as black/mixed men in undefined activities along with a smaller decline 
among equivalent groups of women, an increase in representation of most groups in 
accommodation/food; a decline in representation of most groups in agriculture with the 
exception of indigenous men and women who experienced an increase and finally a major 
decline in representation of women from white/yellow and black/mixed groups in domestic 
service accompanied by a smaller decline among indigenous women who in any case are 
not as strongly over-represented in this occupation. There was some increase in this category 
of men from white/yellow and indigenous groups but they are also not strongly over-
represented.  Indigenous women are absent from most occupations with the exception of 
other social services, trade and repairs, agriculture and domestic services.  
 
To sum up, there has been some convergence in earnings across different occupational 
categories over time. At the same time, income hierarchies and gender segmentation 
remains intact in the labour market.  As we would expect, workers from lower income 
households are concentrated at the bottom of the wage hierarchy while those from wealthier 
quintiles are found in the better paid ones. Women are crowded into a limited range of 
occupations, outnumbering men in education, health and social services at the better paid of 
the hierarchy and more markedly more so in domestic services at the poorer paid end. There 
is less evidence of segmentation along ethno-racial lines with greater evidence of parity 
between white/yellow and black/mixed. Indigenous groups on the other hand tend to be over-
represented in agriculture and increasingly so over time.  
 
Inequalities by earnings and work status  
 
Table 3.8 continues the discussion of inequalities in labour market outcomes, this time 
ranking work status according to earnings. This ranking did not change between 2002 and 
2013.  Employers, public sector workers and military personnel are all higher paid work 
statuses, earning between 2,658 and 5,051 Brazilian BRL a month in 2013. Next in rank were 
wage workers with licences, the self-employed followed by wage workers without licenses.  
The poorest among the wage earners are domestic workers with or without licences (earning 
868 and 553 BRL respectively) while there are further categories of unpaid, own-account and 
subsistence workers who barely earn any income.  The highest rates of growth in earnings 
were reported by domestic workers and wage workers without licenses but, as noted, this did 
not serve to alter the ranking of work status by earning.  
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Table 3.8 
Work Status 2002 2013 YΔ% 
Employer 1,979.2 5,051.5 8.9% 
Statutory Public Worker 1,039.4 2,686.8 9.0% 
Military 1,150.0 2,657.9 7.9% 
Employee with Work Licence 663.9 1,553.5 8.0% 
Self-Employed 494.1 1,373.0 9.7% 
Other Employee without Work Licence 363.8 1,050.6 10.1% 
Domestic Worker with Work Licence 289.7 868.4 10.5% 
Domestic Worker without Work Licence 175.5 533.1 10.6% 
Non-Remunerated 4.0 5.2 2.4% 
Own Production Worker 1.2 2.0 4.8% 
Own Consumption Worker 0.8 0.0 -100.0% 
 
Table 3.9 examines how different social groups are distributed across these work statuses, 
following the same break-down as before.  As before, the upper half of the table reports on 
simple inequalities while the lower half examines intersecting inequalities. As expected, the 
ratio of poorer workers to the wealthiest is well below parity in the better-remunerated work 
status and above parity in the more poorly remunerated statuses, mainly the self-employed 
and domestic service.   
 
The distribution by gender is less clearly associated with rates of remuneration. Women make 
up twice as many statutory public workers as men and are nearly on par with men regarding 
the proportion of employees with work licenses.  However, the ratio of women to men is 10.8 
rising to 11.3 among domestic workers with a license and 24.8 declining to 21.0 among 
domestic workers without a licence. They also proportionally outnumber men among the 
unpaid family workers and own production workers. As far as the distribution of ethno-racial 
categories is concerned, the results suggest that white/yellow workers dominate in the better 
paid categories of employers, somewhat less so as public sector workers and employees 
with work licenses.  They are less likely than other groups to be found in poorly paid 
categories of employees without work licences and domestic workers. While black/mixed 
workers outnumber other groups in the military, both black/mixed and indigenous workers 
outnumber white/yellow workers among workers without licences. Indigenous workers 
outnumber the rest among own-production and own-consumption work which are effectively 
unremunerated. This appears to have increased over time. Rural workers outnumber urban 
workers in various forms of self-employment and non-remunerated activity – this 
concentration has increased over time.  
 
Turning to workers at the intersection of economic, gender and ethno-racial categories, we 
find some evidence of improvement in poorer sections of the working population. Among the 
poorest men and women from different ethno-racial categories there appears to have been 
some movement out of self-employed status and into employer status between 2002 and 
2013. This suggests an improvement in returns to their enterprise efforts. There has also 
been a considerable increase in numbers from all these categories entering the military, some 
increase in employees with work licenses (except for indigenous males) and a considerable 
decline in employees without work licenses for all categories. Of particular interest is the 
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changing composition of domestic work with and without licences. There seems to have been 
a rise in the ratio of men in domestic worker with licences from all ethno-racial categories and 
of indigenous women to the reference group and a substantial decline in the ratio of women 
from poorer white/yellow and black/mixed groups. In addition, there has been a dramatic 
decline in ratios of women from different ethno-racial categories in domestic work without 
license. This would suggest that men from poorer households are more likely to enter 
licensed domestic work while women from poorer households are moving out of domestic 
work without licenses.  
 
Referring back to Table 3.8, we can see that domestic and other workers with license earn 
considerably higher wages than those without licenses, confirming that formalization of some 
of the activities in which poor women and men were involved has contributed to the reduction 
of group-based and intersecting inequalities. Nevertheless, even with these improvements, it 
appears that indigenous women and the rural poor continue to find it difficult to improve their 
market opportunities.  
 
Overall, therefore, as far as work status is concerned, there were clear signals of 
improvement, both with a convergence of income among market occupations, particularly in 
relation to domestic work but also to informal labour. While women are persistently 
overrepresented in both “out-of-market” activities and the least paid occupation of domestic 
workers, they moved into better protected and better paid formal categories of domestic work. 
Ethno-racial market segmentation, with ‘white/yellow’ men over-represented in the formal 
market work statuses and most notably as employers appears to persist. Amongst the 
poorest, the main, and positive, sign of change is one of formalization of the work status, to 
the benefit of those most disadvantaged by intersecting inequalities.  
 
3.4 Unpaid reproductive work  
 
The use of time is closely related to ability to take advantage of economic opportunities and 
bears more heavily on women because of their culturally-sanctioned responsibility for 
unpaid domestic and care work.  This has been recognised in SDG 5 on gender equality 
where SDG 5.4 notes the need to recognize and value such work and promote a fairer 
distribution within the household. Information collected in the PNAD allows us to examine 
how this work is distributed between men and women in different groups.   
 
Figure 3.12 examines the distribution of unpaid reproductive work by gender across 
different income groups.  First of all, it confirms what has been noted in much of the world, 
that women do many more hours of such work than men in all income groups. Secondly, it 
notes that while the number of hours women put into such work declines fairly consistently 
by level of income, presumably because better off women can afford paid substitutes or 
labour-saving technologies for their time in such work, male hours vary very little by income. 
Thirdly, it shows that hours of reproductive work by women has declined over time (for 
instance, from 28.7 hours a week for women in the lowest decile in 2002 to 26.4 in 2013.  
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The relationship with income levels remains in evidence but irrespective of income, women 
spent 10 hours more a week in unpaid domestic work (reproductive work). There is less 
change in male patterns. 
 
Figure 3.12 Distribution of hours per week in reproductive work by gender and 
income 
 
 
Figures 3.13 shows hours into reproductive work by income for different ethno-racial groups. 
There pattern for men from white/yellow and black/mixed groups is remarkably similar with 
very little variation by income.  The pattern for women from these groups is also similar with 
both showing a decline by income.  The pattern for indigenous groups is very different. 
Indigenous men increased their hours in reproductive work in the zero income group since 
2002 but it declines dramatically for those in the 10% and higher income groups. Indigenous 
women have dramatically increased their hours of reproductive work in the zero income group 
since 2002 but this rises with income for the 10-30% income groups and then declines 
slightly.  What is worth noting is that there was a decline in hours of reproductive work for all 
ethno-racial groups at the higher end of the income distribution between 2002 and 2013, 
although indigenous women still put in more hours on average at this end (26.2 hours) than 
other groups (21.2 for black/mixed women and 20.4 for white/yellow women). Indigenous 
men report fewer hours at this end of the income distribution than other ethno-racial groups.  
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Figure 3.13.1 
 
Figure 3.13.2 
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Figure 3.13.3 
 
Overall therefore we can say that Brazilian men provide between 10-20 hours a week less in 
reproductive work than women. Translating into around 3 hours a day, this clearly has a 
significant impact on the ability of women to avail themselves of labour market opportunities 
on the same terms as men. We can also say that this disadvantage is greater at lower levels 
of income. At the same time, there does appear to have been some reduction in the hours 
put in by women between 2002 and 2013 but little change on the part of men.  
 
3.5 Access to, and control over land  
 
We turn next to an issue that is likely to have particular relevance to the rural poor, the right 
to land, which is linked to SDGs 1, 2 and 5. The PNAD defined five types of land access: 
ownership, tenancy, assignee (occupation/use of land with owners consent but no share of 
proceeds), squatter (occupation/use of land without owner’s permission) and partner 
(authorized occupation/use in return for retribution through share of production). Both 
squatter and assignee status are regarded as precarious forms of access.  
 
Table 3.10 reports on average non-labour income associated with these different forms of 
access. It represents the difference between “income from all sources” and “income from all 
jobs’. It includes income from non-labour sources, such as rents, profits and interests but 
also social transfers. Although full attribution is not possible, it confirms that a relationship 
between levels of income and security of access.  
 
Table 3.11 examines how access and ownership of land is distributed and how this 
distribution has changed over time.  As far as vertical inequalities are concerned, we can 
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see that poorer households were less likely than richer ones to report ownership of land, 
somewhat more likely to report tenancy and partner status and considerably more likely to 
report assignee and squatter status. The table also suggests some increase in ownership 
among the poor relative to the rich but a decline in all other forms of access.  
 
Table 3.10 Non-labour income in BRL 
Rights to land 2002 2013 YΔ% 
Owner 109.84 315.78 38.3% 
Tenant 51.00 222.84 26.2% 
Assignee 29.47 155.17 22.1% 
Squatter 50.40 154.61 36.1% 
Partner 42.88 117.38 40.0% 
 
Table 3.11 Distribution of access and ownership of land by vertical, horizontal and 
intersecting inequalities  
Ratios Owner Tenant Assignee Squatter Partner 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Household Income Percentile 
Bottom 40% / Top 
10% 0.63 0.83 1.09 0.66 25.38 2.80 18.33 4.89 4.25 2.62 
Gender 
Female / Male 0.97 0.96 0.46 0.75 1.81 1.45 0.88 1.41 0.62 0.78 
Rural / Urban 
Rural / Urban 1.01 1.09 0.61 0.50 1.50 1.22 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.87 
Ethnic Group/"White & Yellow" 
Black & Mixed 0.78 0.88 1.12 0.79 1.97 1.93 5.23 2.72 1.06 1.40 
Indigenous 1.13 1.06 0.22 0.34 1.21 0.98 0.00 3.50 0.44 0.15 
Intersecting - Group within the 10%-30% per capita hh income bracket / "White & Yellow Male 
Top 10% per capita household income" 
White & Yellow Male 0.74 0.82 0.82 0.93 15.10 8.11 3.67 0.00 4.17 3.83 
White & Yellow 
Female 0.39 0.92 0.88 0.00 49.70 21.56 7.33 0.00 2.08 0.00 
Black & Mixed Male 0.59 0.81 1.51 0.49 18.80 9.00 27.00 19.00 3.63 3.46 
Black & Mixed 
Female 0.58 0.70 0.42 0.70 31.70 11.11 26.67 27.33 1.83 1.67 
Indigenous Male 1.13 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.00 0.00 0.00 
Indigenous Female 1.13 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.00 
 
 
As far as gender is concerned, women appeared almost as likely as men to report land 
ownership with little change over time. This is remarkable, given widespread gender 
inequalities in land distribution documented in the international literature. What the table does 
not tell us is the quantity and quality of land owned by men and women. Women are 
considerably less likely to be tenants, squatters and partners but more likely to be assignees. 
Over time, the likelihood of being tenants, partners and squatters has increased but the 
likelihood of assignment declines. Ownership of land does not differ much by rural/urban 
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location though it increased slightly over time. Tenancy and partnership do not appear 
common in rural areas and there was a decline in most forms of access. 
 
Ethno-racial identities appear to have a bearing on land access. Relative to both white/yellow 
and black/mixed categories, indigenous groups appear more likely to report land ownership 
though this likelihood declined over time. This explains their concentration in agricultural 
occupations. They were less likely to have tenancy arrangements. Both tenancy status and 
squatting increased somewhat over time but the likelihood of being assignees and partners 
declined.  Combining the different forms of inequality, the key findings are that relative to the 
most privileged groups in the population, only indigenous men and women were more likely 
to report landholdings but this declined by 2013. They were far less likely to be assignees 
squatters but many more indigenous reported this practice in 2013. Squatting, assignation 
and partnerships were more likely to be reported by other groups but there appeared to have 
been a decline in most of these practices for most groups. 
 
Overall, there is some suggestion of increased formalization of relations regarding rights to 
land. This seem to suggest an easier access to the ownership of land by previously relatively 
excluded ‘black and mixed’ Brazilians but this seems to have been accompanied by loss of 
ownership among indigenous groups. Land formalization may have encroached on their 
ancestral rights. There is a clear suggestion of a persistent discrimination relating to access 
to land via tenancy agreements, both against women and black, mixed and indigenous 
Brazilians. This is shown even more clearly among the poorest, with poorer white men 
relatively better off than all other groups. The apparent move towards more formalized rights 
to land does not therefore appear to have reduced horizontal and intersecting inequalities in 
access to land.  
 
3.6 Educational outcomes  
 
We conclude our analysis of the PNAD data by examining the distribution of education over 
time. SDG 4 is a standalone goal on education and seeks to improve quality education for 
all. Education is also recognised in the goal on employment as an important factor in 
improving opportunities. Education has also been singled out as one of the key factors 
driving the decline in income inequality in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America.   
 
Table 3.12 reports on a number of summary measures of the distribution of education in 
2002 and 2013.  It suggests a clear decline in the vertical inequalities in education.  
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Table 3.12 
Vertical Inequality 
Years of 
Education 
2002 2013 
Gini Index 0.485 0.423 
Generalized Entropy 2 0.368 0.276 
 
We explore this decline in greater depth by using a number of indicators of education drawn 
from the SDGs and disaggregating for different groups.  These include the percentage of 
children in pre-school (SDG 4.2.1 refers to the percentage of children under 5 years of age 
who are on track for learning), the participation rate in formal education of children at 6 (SDG 
4.2.2 ) and percentage of the population of primary school age (age 6 to 10) achieving literacy 
(SDG 4.6.1).   
 
Figure 3.15 shows these indicators disaggregated by household income for 2002 and 2013. 
It is immediately evident that there has been significant overall improvement. The income 
gradients have declined for all the indicators, most noticeably for the enrolment of 6 years 
olds but also of under-5 in pre-school. The effect on the literacy performance of primary 
school children is also evident, with improvements of nearly 20 percent in the prevalence of 
literate children (among the poorest), bridging the income-led gap in education achievement.  
 
Figure 3.14 
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Figure 3.15 
 
Figure 3.16 shows gender equality in under-5 outcomes for both 2002 and 2013, a small 
advantage for girls in 6 year olds enrolled in school for both years and somewhat larger 
advantage for girls in literacy performance in 2002 which persisted in reduced form in 2013. 
 
Figure 3.16 suggests that regional inequalities persist.  While there appears to be an 
increase in all three indicators of educational progress, the North region was lagging in both 
years of the study. The consistent under-performance and lack of significant improvement 
in the North region leads to an actual increase in the gap between the enrolment in pre-
school and primary school and in the prevalence of literacy among primary school age 
children in relation to the best-off regions of the South and South east.  
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Figure 3.16 
 
Figure 3.17 examines educational inequalities by ethno-racial groups.  There is an overall 
improvement for all three indicators across the three groups.  This seems to have been 
accompanied by a reduction in the educational gap between yellow/white and black/mixed 
groups but children from indigenous groups were not only worst off in 2002 but the size of 
the gap seems to have persisted in 2013 with some convergence only observed in relation 
to children aged 6 who were enrolled in school.  
 
Table 3.13 allows us to explore how intersecting inequalities have fared over our study 
period.  It shows clear signs of improvement in both pre-school and primary school 
enrolment with some convergence towards the levels prevailing among boys from the 
richest and most privileged ethno-racial group. At the same time, children from indigenous 
groups continue to perform worse than others, with indigenous boys at some disadvantage 
among 6 year olds enrolled for school and indigenous girls at a particular disadvantage in 
terms of literacy achievements among 6-10 year olds.  
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Figure 3.17 
 
 
Table 3.13 
Ratios 
Percentage in school (by age) % Literate 
Under 5 Age 6 Age 6-10 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Household Income Percentile 
Bottom 40% / Top 10% 0.27 0.46 0.85 0.97 0.66 0.80 
Gender 
Female / Male 1.07 0.99 1.02 1.02 1.08 1.04 
Region/Sul 
Norte 0.81 0.49 1.01 0.97 0.84 0.83 
Nordeste 1.11 0.83 1.05 1.04 0.71 0.85 
Sudeste 1.16 0.99 1.08 1.04 0.95 1.01 
Centro-Oeste 0.66 0.65 1.00 1.01 0.96 1.00 
Distrito Federal 1.24 0.92 1.07 1.03 0.93 1.00 
Ethnic Group/"White & Yellow" 
Black & Mixed 0.85 0.87 0.94 1.00 0.82 0.91 
Indigenous 0.22 0.32 0.49 0.90 0.69 0.74 
Intersecting inequalities: ratio of girls and boys from ethno-racial groups in 10%-30% of income 
distribution to boys from white/yellow group in the top 10% of income distribution  
White/yellow boys  0.24 0.70 0.82 0.90 0.72 0.74 
White/yellow girls  0.28 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.75 0.72 
Black/mixed boys 0.28 0.74 0.84 0.89 0.60 0.61 
Black/mixed girls  0.28 0.80 0.85 0.89 0.69 0.67 
Indigenous boys  0.51 0.86 .. 0.71 1.14 1.11 
Indigenous girls  0.00 0.73 0.00 0.87 0.91 0.43 
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Tables 3.14 and 3.15 draw attention to changing trends in education among the working-age 
population 15 – 49.  A comparison of the younger age groups in the two years allows us to 
see how different groups who will have benefited from efforts to increase education by the 
Lula government since 2002 have fared. This becomes particularly apparent in the 20-29 age 
bracket, the first cohort where most of the members have already completed their education. 
The tables suggest that years of education (excluding tertiary education) and the proportion 
of individuals with tertiary education increased for all age groups in Brazil, and for all social 
groups, including groups at intersection of different inequalities. The evolution along gender 
lines is worth noting:  while the first indicator suggest that men’s years of education increased 
more than women’s, particularly within the black/mixed ethno-racial group, the increase of 
women’s progression to tertiary education exceeded that of men in almost all groups, except 
for Indigenous people in the 20-29 age bracket. Women already had more years of education 
than men and, while the gap may have reduced, among those without tertiary education 
(particularly relevant here is the 15-19 bracket, below tertiary education age), it translated in 
2013 into an increase in the gender gap in tertiary education. Members of the black/mixed 
and indigenous ethno-racial groups still lag behind those from the white/yellow groups but 
only for the first group did the gaps go down. It is important to note that here as well, 
indigenous women lag behind men from their groups as well as women from other ethno-
racial groups, with the gaps increasing between 2002-2013. 
 
Table 3.14 
  
Brazil Male Female Indigenous White & Yellow Black & Mixed 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Years of school, population without tertiary education 
Age 15-19 7.2 8.3 6.8 8.0 7.5 8.6 6.1 6.5 7.9 8.8 6.5 7.9 
Age 20-29 7.6 9.4 7.3 9.1 8.0 9.8 6.3 8.1 8.5 10.1 6.8 9.0 
Age 30-39 6.5 8.1 6.3 7.8 6.7 8.4 6.2 7.3 7.3 8.9 5.7 7.6 
Age 40-49 5.7 7.1 5.7 6.9 5.8 7.4 4.9 5.8 6.6 7.9 4.8 6.5 
% with Tertiary Education 
Age 20-29 4.6% 10.0% 3.8% 8.2% 5.4% 11.8% 2.2% 7.0% 7.5% 15.5% 1.5% 5.6% 
Age 30-39 8.0% 14.3% 7.0% 12.2% 8.9% 16.3% 3.1% 7.6% 11.8% 22.0% 3.3% 7.8% 
Age 40-49 8.9% 13.1% 8.6% 11.0% 9.2% 15.1% 1.3% 8.9% 13.2% 19.0% 3.3% 7.7% 
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Table 3.15 
  
Indigenous White & Yellow Black & Mixed 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 2002 2013 
Years of school, population without tertiary education 
Age 15-19 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.7 8.5 8.2 9.0 6.1 7.6 6.9 8.3 
Age 20-29 5.5 7.8 6.9 8.4 8.2 9.8 8.7 10.3 6.4 8.6 7.2 9.3 
Age 30-39 5.9 7.1 6.5 7.4 7.1 8.6 7.5 9.1 5.4 7.3 5.9 7.9 
Age 40-49 4.4 6.3 5.3 5.3 6.6 7.7 6.5 8.1 4.7 6.2 4.9 6.8 
% with Tertiary Education 
Age 20-29 0.0% 5.9% 3.8% 7.9% 6.4% 13.1% 8.5% 17.8% 1.1% 4.5% 1.8% 6.7% 
Age 30-39 2.4% 5.6% 3.6% 9.3% 10.6% 19.5% 13.0% 24.2% 2.7% 6.3% 3.9% 9.3% 
Age 40-49 2.8% 5.4% 0.0% 12.5% 13.0% 16.4% 13.3% 21.3% 2.9% 6.3% 3.6% 9.1% 
 
 
Section 4: Explaining the Decline in Intersecting Inequalities  
 
The decline in income inequality in Brazil in the early 2000s, even more so than the decline 
in poverty, has attracted a great deal of attention within the international development 
community because it occurred in a country with historically high levels of income inequality 
during a period that has been characterised by dramatically rising income inequalities in the 
rest of the world. Our analysis of national household data suggests that the decline in income 
inequality has benefited historically disadvantaged groups, men and women at the 
intersection of class, race and gender inequalities although indigenous groups continue to 
lag behind the rest.  The explanations put forward to explain Brazil’s break with its long history 
of inequalities encompass both policies and politics. In this section, we attempt to pull 
together some of these explanations in order to draw out what they tell us about the decline 
in intersecting inequalities, an aspect of social change that has attracted somewhat less 
attention in this literature.  
 
4.1 From ‘conservative modernization’ to ‘liberal neo-developmentalism’ 
 
While a number of researchers have pointed to the commodity boom of the early 2000s and 
the strong growth rates that characterised much of that decade as the main explanation for 
the decline in economic inequalities, Amman and Barrientos (2014)  point out earlier periods 
of growth had not had the same impact: ‘For example, during the so-called ‘miracle years’ 
under military rule between 1967-73, Brazil’s growth record, though very impressive by 
historical standards, could not overshadow the fact that income inequalities were widening 
and very little progress was being made in tackling entrenched poverty …. This is in sharp 
contrast to conditions since 2003 in which strong growth has gone hand in hand with a historic 
reversal of inequality trends’ (p. 1).  
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Instead, Amman and Barrientos as well as a number of other authors suggest that the policies 
adopted by Brazil in the wake of its democratic transition added up to a new development 
approach, one which combined elements of neo-liberal orthodoxy with interventionist 
measures associated with its previous state-led ‘developmentalist’ tradition to produce what 
has been termed a ‘liberal neo-developmentalist’ policy regime (Cornell, 2012; Grinberg, 
2016). It was this willingness to move away from the policy orthodoxy that was associated 
with rising inequalities in much of the rest of the world that allowed Brazil to buck the trend.  
 
The early 1990s was a period marked by hyperinflation and continued low rates of growth. It 
began with the widespread dismantling of various barriers to trade, marking the end of the 
ISI strategy and opening up the Brazilian economic to foreign competition.  Financial markets 
were also liberalized, leading to a surge in portfolio investment and the appreciation of BRL 
exchange rates at a time when domestic companies had lost the protections of the ISI period 
and suffered from high interest rates. Imports grew at a pace much faster than exports. The 
adoption of the Plano Real (Real Plan) in 1993-94 by President Cardoso upheld strong 
adherence to price stability using the orthodox methods of central bank independence and 
inflation targeting.    
 
While the 1988 Constitution had extended a range of labour rights and protections and 
encouraged greater attention to redistribution, with a particular focus on the worst off groups 
and regions, the adverse economic conditions in the years that followed ruled out the 
possibility of much progress on this.  Instead, various reforms were undertaken to make 
labour markets more flexible, increasing informality and doubling unemployment. In addition, 
the decision to end the indexing of wages to inflation rates and to limit increases in the 
minimum wage led to a decline in average real wages in the second half of the 1990s (Berg, 
2010).   
 
The left-wing Workers Party that took power in 2001 appeared committed to promoting 
Brazil’s ability to compete in the global economy and retained the core elements of the Real 
Plan. The continuity of macroeconomic policy not only served to contain inflation but also in 
providing a predictable platform for both domestic and foreign investors. 
  
At the same time, the government deviated from classic neoliberal prescriptions in a number 
of important ways. One was interventionist economic policy. The Lula government came to 
power at a time when more competitive exchange rates and a global commodities boom had 
given rise to a more favourable macroeconomic environment but it took steps to shape the 
pattern of subsequent growth.  It adopted a ‘growth acceleration program’ which expanded 
aggregate demand in the economy through state investment in infrastructure, increased 
supply of credit by state banks and expanded investment by state-owned enterprises 
(Barbosa and Souza, 2010).  The state supported public enterprises to compete in the open 
economy and to diversify the domestic productive base.  
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A second deviation from orthodox prescriptions related to labour market policies. The 
economic recovery generated a large number of new jobs, both in the export sector and the 
import-competing manufacturing sector. Additional policies were put in place to encourage 
greater formalization of the economy, including reducing the costs of registering small 
business and simplifying their tax obligations as well as incentivizing labour inspectors to 
ensure conformity to labour regulations (Berg, 2010). As a result around 20 million new jobs 
were created after 2003, most of which were in the formal economy. 
   
Of particular significance in the formalization process was the extension by the 1988 
Constitution of the right of domestic workers to organize.  While their precarious conditions 
meant union membership remains low, the existing unions had been able to use the law and 
the labour courts to drive the registration of domestic workers so that during the 1990s when 
formal employment was falling, formalization among domestic workers was on the rise and 
continued to rise in the 2000s.  
 
The third aspect of the policy regime which deviated from the neo-liberal orthodoxy was the 
pursuit of active redistributive policies.  Some important social measures reaching out to 
poorer sections had already been in place in the 1990s: the Unified Health System (1990); 
the Rural Social Insurance (1993) which aimed at including rural informal workers within the 
existing Social Insurance Fund; the Family Health Programme (1994) which sought to extend 
health provision to lower income groups; the FUNDEF programme (1994) to upgrade basic 
education; a non-contributory pension (1996) to provide transfers to poorer older people and 
people with disabilities; and the Bolsa Escola and PETI programmes (1995), offering 
conditional cash transfers to poor families to reduce child labour and promote children’s 
health and education.  The Lula administrations (2003-11) consolidated all federal 
guaranteed income programmes into Bolsa Família while at the same time expanding the 
target population to 13 million households. By the end of the 2000s they reached a quarter 
of the population, lifted 20 million people out of abject poverty and nearly halved the 
proportion of people living below the total poverty line. 
 
A particularly important redistributive measure was the policy of increasing the minimum 
wage above the inflation rate which was adopted by Lula and continued by Rousseff. In Brazil, 
minimum wages provide a floor for labour earnings in formal employment and a benchmark 
for wage settlements of informal workers (the lighthouse effect). In addition, minimum social 
insurance pensions and non-contributory pensions were indexed to the minimum wage. The 
real value of the minimum wage was increased several times, with the bottom quintile of the 
labour force seeing its incomes rise by 38 per cent between 2003 and 2008.  
 
Despite a highly regressive tax system in which the poor paid more taxes than the rich 
because of reliance on indirect taxes, the expansion of social expenditures could be financed 
because of the introduction of two new taxes in 1997 which shifted the financing of social 
policy from reliance on social security contributions and general tax revenues to a more 
diversified funding mix (Amman and Barrientos, 2014).  The increasing rates of economic 
growth in the 2000s not only increased the value and quantity of social insurance 
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contributions, but also the amounts collected from earmarked taxes. These conditions 
enabled a rapid increase in social expenditure, in absolute and relative terms. 
 
Certain features of this policy regime added further to its inclusive nature. One was that the 
mix of economic and social policies worked to reinforce each other (Amman and Barrientos, 
2014; Berg, 2010). The strong focus on health and education of target groups, particularly 
the most disadvantaged, not only served to reduce large disparities across states, 
municipalities and socioeconomic groups but also fed directly in to the skills and productivity 
of the labour force. In addition, as Berg points out, it reduced the number of youth entering 
the labour market every year in search of jobs. The combined effects of growth and social 
policy explain why the rate of income growth was around 19-11% per annum in the lower 
income deciles compared to around 7-8% in the higher. Studies suggest that income growth 
among the lower quintiles was driven by a combination of improvements in employment, the 
rise in minimum wage and income transfers.  
 
The other important feature was that the growth in social expenditure in Brazil and is impact 
on the incomes of disadvantaged groups led to multiplier effects through their impact on 
domestic demand. For instance, the IPEA estimated that the GDP multiplier of social 
expenditure taken as a whole was of the order of 1.37 in the mid-2000s, while the social 
expenditure multiplier in household income growth rates was higher at 1.85 (cited in Amman 
and Barrientos, p. 13). 
 
4.2 The politics of social change  
 
While the preceding analysis outlines the combination of policy measures that helped to bring 
about a decline in the country’s long-standing inequalities, it poses an interesting question: 
how did these policies come to be adopted in a country that had enjoyed many periods of 
growth in the past without seeking to address its high levels of poverty and inequality? 
Instead, as Skidmore (2004) pointed out, government policies on taxes and expenditures had 
in the past consistently favoured the 5-10% of the population who controlled most of the 
country’s wealth as well as the main levers of its government: ‘In practice, federal government 
acts as a powerful channel for redistributing income from those on the bottom to those at the 
top’ (p. 46).  
 
In their discussion of the emergence of a new development policy regime in Brazil, Amman 
and Barrientos refer to the ‘forging of a broad consensus across the political spectrum, key 
actors in business, the labour movement and civil society’ (p. 6) and to the ‘depth of the “buy-
in” (across the political spectrum’ (p. 3) that underpinned these policies. They explain this in 
terms of collective acknowledgement of the exhaustion of the previous economic model 
‘which had effectively “locked in” hyperinflation’, the clever combination of orthodox and 
heterodox measures that made up the new policy regime and the ‘politically adept, 
consultative and inclusive approaches’ (p. 3) of the administrations that began this process 
after the transition to democracy. But others suggest that the ability to undertake the 
ambitious redistributive agenda, associated in particular with the Lula regime, rested on 
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favourable political conditions which had been engendered by long term political processes 
that began before the transition to democracy.  
 
A recent ODI report on countries which had achieved a degree of success in addressing 
intersecting inequalities highlight a number of facilitating factors: social movements that build 
the case for, and mobilize around, the policy and politics necessary to address intersecting 
inequalities; enabling processes of constitutional change; left-wing orientation of parties in 
power; and efforts to deepen democracy beyond formal electoral politics (Paz Araudo et al, 
2014). All of these factors have featured in the Brazilian context and indeed Brazil was one 
of the case studies in the report.  We elaborate on how these factors have played out in 
Brazil.  
 
Social movements 
 
It is clear from a reading of the Brazilian literature that the movement for democracy began 
sometime in the 1970s, well before democracy was restored.  Studies of this period stress 
both the broad-based nature of mobilization by civil society (Baiocchi et al., 2008) as well as 
the specificities of forms it took (Dagnino, 2007), both factors that had an important bearing 
on the nature of the transition to democracy and its aftermath.  
 
The onset of military rule in Brazil in 1964 was followed soon after by the harsh repression of 
all opposition.  The military’s disregard for human rights and legality lost it the support of 
some of its traditional allies. Elite sectors of the establishment, including journalist, lawyers, 
the political opposition and the Catholic Church began to confront the military on its human 
rights record.  As Hochstetler (1997) argues, by challenging the legitimacy of the military 
regime, these traditionally politically active sectors of the elite opened up a space for a 
grassroots opposition to emerge. Given efforts by the state to contain and de-politicize civil 
society organizations, neighbourhood associations and church groups became the only 
legitimate places for organizing around popular grievances, leading to a highly decentralized 
forms of protest at the grassroots level.  
 
These different streams of opposition to military rule swelled into a growing demand for 
democracy but there were interesting divergences in what was being demanded. In their 
study of attitudes to democracy in the Brazilian population, Rochon and Mitchell (1989) 
distinguished between attitudes supporting the ‘procedures of democracy’ (removing the 
military from politics, reducing state control over unions and strengthening Congress) and 
those supporting the ‘substance of democracy’ in terms of universal suffrage (people are 
capable of voting wisely, the vote should be extended to illiterates). They found that most 
people surveyed in 1972 expressed weak support for either meaning of democracy. This had 
changed considerably by 1982. For instance, opposition to the military in politics rose from 
21% in 1972 to 48% in 1982; support for direct elections went from 57% in 1972 to 82% in 
1982 while support for extending the vote to illiterates went from 38 to 56%.  What was striking 
was that while elite attitudes changed in favour of democratic procedures, those from poorer 
sections expressed greater support for equality of participation in the democratic process. As 
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the authors point out, the literacy qualification was still in place at that time, disenfranchising 
25% of the population aged 15+.  
 
The Catholic Church played a special role in mobilizing grassroots opposition to military rule 
through a strategy of setting up of Christian Base Communities within neighbourhoods 
(Cavendish, 1994). Although progressive sections of the clergy had been supporting 
associations of disenfranchised groups since the 1950s, it began to play a far more active 
role in the 1970s with the rise of liberation theology. The Church increased the safety of 
activists, helped to make strong connections among community members and nurtured the 
rise of new social movements. Its influence is evident in a great deal of the social movement 
literature. Alvarez (1989) pointed it out in relation to women’s movements, Gondim (1989/90) 
in relation to neighbourhood movements, Bernadino-Costa in relation to domestic workers 
unions, Assies (1999) on urban neighbourhood associativism and Della Cava (1989) in 
relation to indigenous, neighbourhood, and landless movements. Citing Della Cava, 
Hochstetler points out that the Catholic Church could play this role because “...no other 
institution except for the military, enjoyed a nation-wide network of cadres, a system of 
communications (even if only door to door) that functioned despite censorship and, unlike the 
military, a world-wide organization on which it could draw for support and bank on for an 
international ‘hearing’.”(Della Cava 1989, p. 147)  
 
There was another aspect of social movements during this period echoes some of the earlier 
literature on ‘horizontal sociabilities’ that appeared to distinguish relations between different 
ethno-racial groups at the lower end of the income distribution in Brazil. Dagnino (2007) points 
to the role of cultural politics in shaping the movement for democracy, extending it beyond 
the demand for the formal institutions of democracy to the demand for equality of participation 
that (as the study by Rochon and Mitchell had found) informed the understanding of 
democracy among poor and marginalized groups. She notes in particular how interpretations 
of citizenship became central elements in building this new inclusive cultural politics. 
Citizenship was defined, first and foremost, as ‘the right to have rights’, a definition that 
challenged previous definition that had been used by the state and dominant classes to 
exclude large sections of the population: ‘Class, race, and gender differences constitute the 
main bases for the social classification that has historically pervaded our cultures and 
established different categories of people hierarchically disposed in their respective "places" 
in society’ (p. 2474). To be poor in Brazil was not only to be materially deprived but also to 
be denied human dignity and political voice.  
 
The concept of citizenship was mobilized to express both the general demand for equal rights 
embedded in the predominant conception of citizenship but also extended and specified in 
accordance with specific demands. Citizenship provided a common ground between those 
struggling redistributive demands, such as housing, land, wages and so on within their 
neighbourhoods and work places and those challenging cultural rules that denied them 
recognition, including ethnic minorities, women, sexual rights activists and human rights 
activists more generally.  In many cases, this common ground served not only to extend rights 
to those who had been previously excluded but to give rise to new categories of rights which 
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sought to remedy injustices previously not acknowledged: the right to autonomy over one’s 
own body, to sexual freedom, to racial justice.  
 
It was this struggle over culture that appears to have been a particularly important hallmark 
of the Brazilian transition, given the significance of the intersection between economic 
deprivation and cultural devaluation which characterized its more enduring inequalities.  In 
encompassing the cultural dimension of citizenship, these movements seemed to have 
effectively politicized the ‘horizontal sociabilities’ that had  characterized social relations 
between different groups at the lower end of the income distribution: ‘The struggle for 
citizenship was thus presented as a project for a new sociability: not only for the incorporation 
of broader citizenship into the political system in the strict sense, but for a more egalitarian 
format for social relations at all levels, new rules for living together in society (negotiation of 
conflicts, a new sense of a public order, public responsibility, and a new social contract)’ (p. 
2475). 
 
Democratic practice in formal politics 
 
While the social movements that became active around the struggle for democracy 
encompassed many different groups with various kinds of demands, labour organizations 
emerged as among the most influential. The New Union Movement had its origins in the 
wildcat strikes that broke out in the late 1970s and workers’ increasing demands for greater 
shop floor democracy in direct challenge to the older, organized unions which had long been 
co-opted by the state. The membership of the new movement soon exceeded that of 
organized labour and became part of the proliferation of civil society organizations that 
spearheaded the opposition to the military regime.  When the military moved to legalize the 
setting up of new parties, it founded the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or Workers Party, 
under the leadership of ‘Lula’ da Silva with the objective of promoting an alternative form of 
politics to the clientelistic relations (‘citizenship by concession’) which had taken deep roots 
in the country’s political culture.  
 
The PT adopted the bottom-up participatory model of its allies in the progressive clergy which 
emphasised the need to build from the base up, the strategy of ‘basismo’. This began with 
nuclei of small groups of people who were organized by neighbourhood, job category, work 
place or social movement (Keck, 1992) which met regularly to discuss issues of relevance to 
the party and the wider movement.  The party avoided official ties with any single union or 
federation or with Catholic Church, the women’s movements and so on but invited their 
representatives to join the party and influence its platform.  As Guidry suggests, ‘For both 
labour and popular leaders, basismo was a radical form of democracy that inverted the 
traditional top-down, hierarchical form of political relationships in Brazil, creating the space 
for the direct democracy and conscientizacão stressed in Freirian ideology’ (p. 91). As Serbin 
points out, while the Church was the glue that had held together the progressive groups that 
opposed the military before 1985, after 1985 the glue became the Workers’ Party.  
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Brazil had its first presidential election in over two decades when military stepped down in 
1985.  One of the first acts of the newly elected President was to remove the literacy 
requirement which had disenfranchised a sizeable proportion of the population so that the 
municipal elections later that year were the first to be based on universal suffrage in the 
country’s history. The PT won a number of major cities in the 1988 municipal elections, 
including Porto Alegre and São Paulo, and went on to win further victories at the local level 
in later years. It was able use its control of municipal governments to try out various 
experiments in participatory democracy (Baiocchi, 2003).  The best known of these was 
participatory budgeting pioneered by the party in Porto Alegre but adopted in a number of 
cities that the party governed. The Bolsa Escola program was first developed in the mid- 
1990s in municipalities governed by the PT and later became the basis of the national Bolsa 
Familia under Lula’s regime.  
 
Brazil also adopted a new constitution in 1988 which, as the ODI report pointed out, 
‘represented an explicit effort to break with historically-established patterns of inequality, 
based on intersections between poverty, race, ethnicity, gender and location, which 
characterised the region’. This was reflected in strong commitment to social and economic 
rights inscribed into the constitution.  As Hevia-Pacheco and Vergara-Camus (2013) point 
out, this was a view of rights which was understood in universal terms, granted on the basis 
of citizenship, a departure from earlier views which linked had rights to an occupation or some 
other qualification. They also note that what distinguished this constitution from previous ones 
which had been a largely elite affair was that it was the culmination of ‘an intense process of 
social mobilisation from organisations from the whole political spectrum, including from civil 
society organisations and social movements, which had historically been excluded from these 
proceedings’.  
 
Although the economic conditions prevailing in the country at the time and the neo-liberal 
reforms adopted by the government in response made it difficult for it to live up to these 
commitments, the constitution nevertheless exercised a great deal of symbolic power. Some 
effort to promote policies designed to reach the poor and marginalized were put in place in 
the 1990s and while they achieved an extension of social security to rural areas and an 
expansion in education, they did little to stem rising inequalities associated with the attempts 
to implement neo-liberal austerity programmes. Mass mobilization against the reforms led to 
the election of the PT which had been active in campaigning for the new constitution and 
could invoke its authority to promote a redistributive programme when it took over the 
government.   
 
The massive expansion in social programmes undertaken by Lula can thus be seen as an 
attempt to deliver on the promises of the 1988 constitution.  The government took a number 
of measures which were explicitly targeted to previously excluded groups, including quotas 
for Afro-descendants in public universities, the Brasil Quilombola program, the National 
Integral health Policy for the Black Population, the national Policy for the Promotion of Racial 
Equality and National Plans for Policies for women. But as the ODI report points out, ‘the 
major thrust of its strategy for addressing intersecting inequalities has been through more 
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general programmes for poverty reduction in keeping with the principle of universalism in 
access to social security enshrined in the constitution’.  
 
Various mechanisms for collaboration with civil society were put into place when it came into 
power. Along with the promotion of participatory budgets, which has received international 
national attention, less-well known efforts include national state or local councils, which 
convene conferences as well as more regular council meetings to review policies in a sector 
or on a specific issue. Delegates to the national conferences were elected in state 
conferences and expected to represent the agreements reached at state level. In a process 
that lasts approximately a year prior to the national conferences, municipal and large city 
conferences are held to review local problems and needs pertaining to specific issues and to 
forward them to the delegates at the national level.  These policy discussions and consultative 
bodies were mentioned in the 1988 Constitution, but have only been implemented by the PT 
government since 2003.  
 
Conclusion  
 
We set out in this paper to explore how the decline in income inequalities observed in Brazil 
since the early 2000s had impacted on men and women who were located at the intersection 
between income inequality and marginalized group identities.  Drawing on national data, we 
found very clear evidence that the lives and life chances of these groups improved during this 
period. We found that gender, ethno-racial and regional inequalities in income had all 
declined, that along with an overall decline in absolute poverty, there had been a decline in 
poverty among different groups, including those defined by intersecting inequalities, with a 
particularly large decline among indigenous people, who were the poorest section of the 
population.  While there was some convergence in earnings across different occupational 
categories, the occupational structure remains stratified by class and gender although among 
poor men and women, the formalization of work status emerged as a major indicator of 
improvement in working conditions. There has also been increased formalization of land 
rights to the benefit of most groups with the exception of indigenous men and women.  
 
Summing up our findings, we find that the overall decline in income inequalities in Brazil since 
2000 has been accompanied by an overall decline in horizontal and intersecting inequalities 
in income and its largest component, wages, in labour market conditions, in rights to land, 
and, finally in education, a key driver of greater labour market mobility between 2002 and 
2013. Progress has been slower for certain intersectional groups than others. Women from 
different marginalized ethno-racial groups remained clustered at the lower levels of the 
income distribution and poorer paid jobs. Indigenous men, and to an even greater extent, 
indigenous women are in greatest danger of being left behind. Our explorations of various 
indicators of inequality suggest that this group finds itself with lower incomes and wages than 
other ethno-racial groups, are lagging behind in education, are crowded into narrower range 
of occupations and work statuses and have possibly lost ground in the formalization of land 
rights.  
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What makes these achievements particularly remarkable was they occurred at a time when 
inequalities have been rising in much of the rest of the world.  We pointed to the long history 
of social mobilization that allowed a party into power that had its roots in this history, whose 
leadership was drawn from the popular classes and who had shown imagination in fostering 
grassroots democratic practices both before and after it came into power. 
 
There are also some important lessons to be learnt from Brazil’s experiment with liberal neo-
developmentalism.  First of all, its achievements reflected the attempts of a government to 
carve out its own path between the macro-economic discipline enforced by the need to 
compete in the global economy and the need for strategic intervention to diversify the 
domestic economy so as to protect it from over-reliance on global markets.  Secondly, by 
defying neo-liberal prescriptions with regard to dismantling welfare provision in the interests 
of labor market flexibility, the Brazilian model showed that it was possible to break with a 
long-standing history of inequality and to channel some of the fruits of growth to those whose 
class, gender and race had long positioned them at the bottom of intersecting economic, 
social and political hierarchies.  Thirdly, and more practically, the Brazilian model 
demonstrated the synergies that could arise between redistributive policies that invested in 
the productivity of the labor force and economic policies that sought to develop domestic 
industrial capacity.  
   
The period covered by our study ends before the political crisis that terminated the rule of the 
Workers Party rule and the led to the impeachment of its leader. The Brazilian political system 
is now mired in allegations of corruption that surround both leading figures of the Workers 
Party as well as of the Opposition that brought it down.  Attention has also turned to the 
decline in the country’s economic performance that had set in by the end of our study period. 
Observers point out that its pattern of growth had not, despite policy efforts, resulted in major 
productivity gains or an increase in the technology content of products made in Brazil (Costa 
et al. 2015).  Instead, increased prosperity and rising levels of consumption led to massive 
import of consumer goods, encouraged by an overvalued exchange rate, and a boom in the 
service economy.  Without deeper structural transformation of the economy, it is not clear 
that growth can be revived.  
 
In addition, there are also limits to redistribution that could be achieved, given the balancing 
act attempted by the Workers’ Party of leaving privilege untouched at the top while attempting 
to address disadvantage at the lower end.  While there was a substantial increase in country’s 
tax revenues over our study period, regressive indirect taxes continue to account for half of 
this revenue, the highest rate of income tax is 28% while the tax burden on capital and finance 
was described as ‘mild’.  According to one calculation, around 0.2 percent of the national 
population owned 47% of declared property and titles (Costa et al).  The Workers Party did 
not show any inclination towards tax reform since it came to power. Redistribution therefore 
did not go far enough to empower those at the bottom to become a sufficiently strong political 
force to hold the Workers Party accountable to those who voted it into power, to prevent its 
slide into corruption and compromise and to counter the continued influence of powerful 
interests who have a stake in maintaining the status quo. 
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Table 3.7 
Class Poo 
Minminmmand 
in hein 
persBlackare 
fouagriclu7utrco
ffRatios 
Public 
Admin-
istration 
Other 
industr. 
activitie
s 
Other 
Activi-
ties 
Educ., 
Health 
and 
Social 
Service
s 
Trans., 
Storage 
and 
Com-
muni-
cations 
Manu-
factu-
ring 
Other 
collec-
tive, 
social 
and 
persona
l 
services 
Trade 
and 
Repairs 
Cons-
truction 
Under-
defined 
Activities 
Accom-
moda-
tion and 
Food 
Agricultu-
re 
Domestic 
Services 
02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 
Household Income Percentile 
Bottom 40% / 
Top 10% 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9 2.7 2.8 6.0 .. 1.1 1.5 11.6 7.8 5.5 8.2 
Gender 
Female / Male 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.0 4.8 4.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.8 1.9 2.3 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.4 1.8 0.7 0.6 19.3 18.8 
Rural / Urban 
Rural / Urban 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.3 9.6 12.4 0.5 0.6 
Ethnic Group/"White & Yellow" 
Black & Mixed 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.8 0.6 1.4 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.6 
Indigenous 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.6 
Intersecting inequalities– Ratio of men and women from different ethno-racial groups and poorest households (10%-30% in income distribution) to ‘white/yellow men 
from top 10% on income distribution 
White & Yellow 
Male 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.0 2.7 3.2 10.0 2.0 0.8 1.0 9.9 6.1 4.5 5.5 
White & Yellow 
Female 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.7 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.1 2.0 0.0 1.1 2.9 7.8 4.2 133.0 116.0 
Black & Mixed 
Male 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 3.3 3.5 8.0 2.0 0.7 1.1 9.5 6.7 7.0 6.0 
Black & Mixed 
Female 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.1 2.0 1.0 1.4 2.7 7.6 4.6 155.0 139.5 
Indigenous 
Male 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 2.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.8 11.3 0.0 4.5 
Indigenous 
Female 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 2.0 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.6 8.7 10.9 30.0 21.0 
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Table 3.9 
Ratios Employer 
Statutory 
public 
worker 
Military 
Employee 
with work 
licence 
Self 
employed 
Employee 
without 
work 
licence 
Domestic 
worker 
with work 
licence 
Domestic 
worker 
without 
work 
licence 
Non-
remune-
rated 
Own 
production 
worker 
Own 
consump-
tion worker 
02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 02 13 
Household Income Percentile 
Bottom 40% 
/ Top 10% 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.6 9.8 17.0 6.1 5.3 11.9 19.8 2.0 .. 
Gender 
Female / 
Male 0.5 0.5 1.9 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 10.8 11.3 24.8 21.0 1.6 2.1 3.6 1.6 0.5 0.0 
Rural /Urban 
Rural / 
Urban 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.3 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 7.7 8.8 7.2 16.2 0.0 1.0 
Ethnic Group/"White & Yellow" 
Black & 
Mixed 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.0 
Indigenous 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 2.6 5.5 3.0 3.0 
Intersecting inequality: ratio of men and women from different ethno-racial groups and poorest households (10%-30% in income distribution) to ‘white/yellow men 
from top 10% on income distribution 
White & 
Yellow Male 0.0 1.3 0.1 .. 0.0 18.3 0.5 0.8 1.5 0.1 2.3 0.1 3.0 7.2 5.0 4.0 9.3 2.9 10.5 0.0 2.0 .. 
White & 
Yellow 
Female 
0.0 0.7 0.1 .. 0.0 37.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.0 1.1 0.2 30.0 18.5 237.0 23.0 14.9 1.8 33.8 0.0 0.0 .. 
Black & 
Mixed Male 0.0 1.2 0.1 .. 0.1 26.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 0.1 2.8 0.1 4.0 7.5 10.0 4.0 8.6 3.3 9.0 0.0 3.0 .. 
Black & 
Mixed 
Female 
0.0 0.8 0.2 .. 0.0 48.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.2 31.0 13.7 280.0 28.0 11.3 1.8 37.0 0.0 1.0 .. 
Indigenous 
Male 0.0 2.1 1.3 .. 0.0 44.7 0.5 0.2 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 23.5 0.0 0.0 14.6 1.6 11.3 0.0 0.0 .. 
Indigenous 
Female 0.0 0.5 0.7 .. 0.0 111.7 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 45.3 60.0 0.0 7.1 2.4 64.5 0.0 0.0 .. 
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Appendix  
Explanation of indicators used.  
 
A first indicator used here is the Group Weighted Coefficient of Variation (GWCOV): GWCOV = 1?̅? (∑ 𝑝𝑟((?̅?𝑟 − ?̅?)2)𝑅𝑟=1 )1 2⁄ , where ?̅?𝑟 = 1𝑛𝑟∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑟𝑖=1  is group r’s mean value, R 
is the number of groups, 𝑝𝑟 is group r’s population share and 𝑦𝑖𝑟 is the observed 
value of income or another variable of interest (e.g., years of education or hours of 
domestic work) of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ member of group r. 
 𝐺𝑊𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 12?̅?∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑠|?̅?𝑟 − ?̅?𝑠|𝑆𝑠=1𝑅𝑟=1  where r and s are, eventually overlapping, group 
index numbers, R=S are the total number of groups, ?̅?𝑘 = 1𝑛𝑘∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘𝑛𝑘𝑖=1  is k’s group 
averages with k=r,s, 𝑝𝑘 is group k’s population share, 𝑦𝑖𝑘 is the observed value of 
income or another variable of interest (e.g., years of education or hours of domestic 
work) of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ member of group k. 
 𝐺𝑊𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙 = ∑ 𝑝𝑟 ?̅?𝑟?̅? (𝑙𝑜𝑔?̅?𝑟 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔?̅?)𝑅𝑟=1 = ∑ 𝑝𝑟 ?̅?𝑟?̅? 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑟=1 ?̅?𝑟?̅? , where ?̅?𝑟 = 1𝑛𝑟∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑟𝑖=1  is 
group r’s mean value, R is the number of groups, 𝑝𝑟 is group r’s population share 
and 𝑦𝑖𝑟 is the observed value of income or another variable of interest (e.g., years of 
education or hours of domestic work) of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ member of group r.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld).  
2
 The datasets were sourced from the IBGE website, in the following page: 
http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/trabalhoerendimento/pnad2011/microdados.shtm 
                                                          
